



THE JAPAN - REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
NORMALISATION PROCESS:  
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES

YUKAKO WADA

1995

A THESIS SUBMITTED AS PARTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES  
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

# JAPAN-REPUBLIC OF KOREA NORMALISATION

## JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES

### INTRODUCTION

Normalisation between Japan and the Republic of Korea was under negotiation from 1951 and took fourteen years to be concluded. In 1965,

This thesis is my own work and all sources have been acknowledged.



Yukako Wada

The most commonly accepted interpretation of the forces supporting the finalisation of the normalisation treaty is that United States East Asian (Cold War) policy was the dominant driving force behind its conclusion. Bruce Cumings states that in the 1960s, the United States 'placed strong pressures on Japan and its near neighbours (especially South Korea) to restore Japan's economic influence in the region. This resulted in the normalisation of relations between Korea and Japan in 1965'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The footnote style used below has been developed according to the principles enunciated in the *Style Manual for Authors, Editors and Printers* (4th edition) i.e. that the style be simple, consistent and provide the necessary information. In the absence of faculty and university guidelines, the style followed is: (1) to provide consistency between European, Korean and Japanese names. All names are listed with family name first, including those embedded as secondary references; (2) Punctuation conventions have differed for the three name groups in that only European names have followed the punctuation guidelines of the *Style Manual*, with the other two name groups not having a comma between the family name and secondary names; (3) Japanese publishing house titles have an initial capital only eg. *Nihon kōron shoin*, Tokyo, 1978; (4) Japanese and Korean words used in the general text (i.e. excluding proper nouns) are italicised.

<sup>2</sup> Cumings, Bruce, 'The Wildest Wish of the Wild is Dead, Long Live the Wildest Wish of the East', in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Hogan, Michael J., Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992, p. 96; Alexander Cheng Tsung-Chi, *The Normalisation of Relations Between Japan and Korea and the Role of the United States East Asian Policy*, U.M.I. Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, 1975. Cheng argues that the changing international environment and American pressure made South Korea and Japan aware of the urgency to finalise the normalisation negotiations and therefore brought early rapprochement.



# JAPAN-REPUBLIC OF KOREA NORMALISATION: JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES

## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Normalisation between Japan and the Republic of Korea was under negotiation from 1951 and took fourteen years to be concluded, in 1965. During this period, the political, strategic and economic situations in both Japan and the Republic of Korea changed dramatically. The Korean regime changed three times while five Japanese governments came and went.

The most commonly accepted interpretation of the forces supporting the finalisation of the normalisation treaty is that United States East Asian (Cold War) policy was the dominant driving force behind its conclusion. Bruce Cumings states that in the 1960s, the United States "placed strong pressures on Japan and its near neighbours (especially South Korea) to restore Japan's economic influence in the region. This resulted in the normalisation of relations between Korea and Japan in 1965".<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> The footnote style used below has been developed according to the principles enunciated in the *Style Manual for Authors, Editors and Printers (4th edition)* i.e. that the style be simple, consistent and provide the necessary information. In the absence of faculty and university guidelines, the style followed is basically that detailed in Chapter 9 of the *Style Manual* adapted in the following ways: (1) To provide consistency between European, Korean and Japanese names, all names are listed with family name first, including those embedded as secondary references; (2) Punctuation conventions have differed for the three name groups in that only European names have followed the punctuation guidelines of the *Style Manual*, with the other two name groups not having a comma between the family name and subsidiary names; (3) Japanese publishing house titles have an initial capital only eg. Nihon keizai shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1978; (4) Japanese and Korean words used in the general text (i.e. excluding proper nouns), are italicised.

<sup>2</sup> Cumings, Bruce, 'The Wicked Witch of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East', in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed Hogan, Michael J., Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992, p. 96; Also see Chang Young-Gil, *The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and Korea and the Role of the United States East Asian Policy*, U.M.I. Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, 1975. Chang argues that the changing international environment and American pressure made South Korea and Japan aware of the urgency to finalise the normalisation negotiations and therefore brought early rapprochement.

Many Japanese academics also stressed the importance of the security issue; especially the role of the United States. Hatada Shigeo argues that the normalisation issue was one of the strategies adopted by the United States for strengthening the Japan-United States security alliance, and that American influence was significant in playing an intermediary role between Japan and the Republic of Korea.<sup>3</sup> The assumptions on which this argument are based seem to be; (1) by being strategically aligned and significantly economically dependent upon American aid and trade, Japanese and South Korean policies were dominated by the United States East Asian (Cold War) policy; (2) governments in Japan and Republic of Korea were the sole actors in the negotiations; and, (3) The history of Japan-Korea relations and domestic politics and policies in the two countries were not as significant enough influences to counter-balance United States East Asian policy in promoting the negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

These assumptions do not fully explain the indigenous interests and the factors promoting the negotiations which were derived from the historical aspects of the bilateral relationship. In particular, the last assumption is itself questionable and appears to be derived from analysis which are predominantly concerned with strategic issues and, possibly, a perspective which discounts the power of domestic policy issues. Some of the articles written from the Korean perspective on this issue argue that the South Korean regime change in 1960 eliminated the strong anti-Japanese stance of the Republic of Korea's

---

This dominance of Japanese policy by the United States is also argued in Barnds, William J. 'Old Issues in a New Context', in ed Barnds, William J., *The Two Koreas and the Role of the United States East Asian Policy*, New York University Press, New York, 1976, p. 12. He states that "Japanese foreign policy has been the alliance with the United States, and the government does not want to work at cross-purposes with Washington".

<sup>3</sup> Hatada Shigeo, "'Nikkan Jōyaku' wa zenzen gunjiteki shikisai o motanai ka", in *Chōsen Kenkyū*, vol. 42, August 1965, pp. 10-14

<sup>4</sup> Chang, op.cit. He states that the historical aspects of Japan-South Korea relations could only been seen as a major obstacle for normalisation, not a factor which promoted the negotiations.

former negotiating position.<sup>5</sup> Memoirs of the Korean negotiators and minutes of the negotiating round released by the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs which verify this shift have been published.<sup>6</sup> There are not as yet, on the other hand, any publications which specifically present Japanese perspectives on the negotiations,<sup>7</sup> thus making it quite difficult to obtain a clear understanding of the significant influences on the Japanese negotiating position.

Evaluating the Japanese perspectives on the normalisation issue, and the negotiations which concluded the treaty, seems necessary for a more balanced view of the process and its determinants. This thesis, therefore, focuses on those Japanese perspectives which influenced the negotiating position of the Japanese government and has attempted to identify, in particular, domestic policy influences.

<sup>5</sup> Nakagawa Nobuo, *Chōsen mondai eno kihonteki shikaku*, Tabata shoten, Tokyo, 1976. He argues that the anti-Japanese posture of the Rhee regime meant that the negotiations would not have been successful until its demise.

<sup>6</sup> Kim Dong-Jo was involved in the negotiations from the beginning to the end. His memoir seems to be regarded as accurate since his work is cited by ex-Japanese Foreign Ministry official Morita Yoshio, see Kim Dong-Jo, *Nikkan kōshō 14 nen no kiroku*, trans. Hayashi Takehiko, Simul shuppankai, Tokyo, 1993; see also, Sasaki Ryūji, 'Imakoso nikkanshō no minaoshi o', *Sekai*, April 1993, pp. 120-136. Sasaki briefly outlines important points in the record of the negotiation talks by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. This ministry also published *The Korean View of Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Asian Policy*, in September 1957. This latter document could not be obtained for this research.

<sup>7</sup> Maeda Toshikazu, 'Nikkan kokkō seijōka mae no jitsujō', in *Keizai to gaikō*, July 1985, pp. 2-11. Maeda Toshikazu was one of the few Japanese Foreign Ministry officials who dealt with the negotiations all the way through. However, this article is very short and does not cover Japanese perspectives comprehensively. Another publication by a Japanese Foreign Ministry official is; Morita Yoshio, 'Nikkan kokkō seijōka kōshō' in *Nippon korea tokuhon*, eds Hayashi Takehiko, and Abe Yō, Kyōiku kaihatsu kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 267-279. He extensively uses material by the Foreign Ministry and others, but this is also a very short article and does not mention Japanese perspectives on the negotiating position; Lee Chong-sik argues that the economic interests of Japan and South Korea were the significant factors in the conclusion of the treaty, but does not mention the impact of United States East Asian policy; see Lee Chong-sik, *Sengo nikkanshō kankeishi*, trans. Okonogi Masao and Furuta Hiroshi, Chūkō sōsho, Tokyo, 1989. Also, Ishikawa mainly focuses on the military issue: he states that the negotiations were not only pursued to meet the aims of United States East Asian policy and for American economic benefit, but also in response to pressure from the Shin-kan group (A pro-South Korean lobby), which perceived South Korea as the front line of Japanese defence; see, Ishikawa Shigeru et al., 'Nikkan kōshō no kihonteki saikentō', *Sekai*, April 1964, p. 20. This point is also stressed by Hatada; see, Hatada Takashi et al, 'Nikkan kaidan no rekishi', in *Ajia afurika kōza III nihon to chōsen*, ed. Hatada Takashi, Keisō shobō, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 49-87



Japanese perspectives are evaluated on two levels; (1) official Japanese East Asian foreign policy; and (2) domestic policy perspectives. The reasons for looking at both foreign and domestic policy and perspectives is that; (1) Japanese East Asian policy itself might have conflicted with United States East Asian policy, thus placing in more perspective the real influence of American East Asian policy; and, (2) domestic policy perspectives in Japan might have significantly influenced the negotiating position of the government. Therefore, the influence of both Japanese foreign policy and domestic perspectives on the negotiating position of the Japanese government during the course of the normalisation treaty negotiations is examined.

The transnational approach to international relations offers a basis for this analytical position. It is different from the once dominant paradigms of international relations theory, such as state-centric theory, in that this approach emphasises the role of domestic policy in the making of foreign policy<sup>8</sup> as well as looking at the significant role of non-state activities in international relations.<sup>9</sup> This is the approach pursued by this study.

This thesis hypothesises that Japanese perspectives, as demonstrated through Japanese East Asian policy and various domestic policy perspectives, were equally important as United States East Asian policy in determining the nature of the negotiations for, and conclusion of, the Japan-Republic of Korea Normalisation Treaty.

---

8 Morse, E. *Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations*, Free Press, New York, 1976

9 Keohane, R. and Nye, J., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1972

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based on a comprehensive analysis of the literature, mainly of the Japanese language literature, concerned with the normalisation issue. Much of that literature was obtained during a fieldwork visit to the National Diet Library in Tokyo and through a number of other libraries in Japan during and following the fieldwork visit. For primary sources, interviews were conducted with those surviving Japanese diplomats who dealt with the normalisation treaty negotiations. Since most of them are quite old, the surviving ones being mostly in their mid 80s and some of them unwell, not all could be interviewed. Of the fourteen Japanese Foreign Ministry officials identified as key members of the Japanese negotiating teams over the course of the negotiations, two had died and, of the other twelve, six agreed to cooperate with the research.<sup>10</sup> Initially, a general questionnaire<sup>11</sup> was sent to all the targeted ex-negotiators with a letter of request. For those who agreed to be interviewed, personalised questionnaires, which were individually designed to reflect each person's role and participation in the negotiation process<sup>12</sup>, were sent. Some only agreed to a telephone interview and some accepted both a telephone interview and a questionnaire. All respondents participated on condition of confidentiality and are therefore cited by number rather than name. Also, a request was made to search Japanese Foreign Ministry files relating to the normalisation treaty. Unfortunately, all related files are still closed, possibly because of their perceived relationship to the normalisation talks still being conducted between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).<sup>13</sup>

---

10 See Appendix 1

11 See Appendix 2

12 See Appendix 3

13 Confidential Source #3 said that the Japanese Foreign Ministry is currently sensitive about the Japanese stance and approach taken on the normalisation negotiations with the DPRK which have been continuing since November 1990; also, the relevant files of the

Australian diplomatic files held in the Australian Archives were also searched, but of the files available, no material of significance could be located. Since the primary sources were limited, secondary materials are extensively used. Of these, many of the journals concerned with the normalisation treaty were written either from a pro-government position or a critical position which strongly opposed normalisation.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, particular care was taken when using materials with a strong political bias.

The Japanese negotiating position in this thesis is defined so as to include negotiations by ruling party politicians and bureaucrats, in both formal round talks and in the preparatory negotiations for the opening of each round of talks.

#### DELIMITATIONS

This thesis only focuses on the factors which influenced the negotiating position of the Japanese government from the beginning of the negotiations until the treaty was concluded. Also, the re-evaluation of Japanese East Asian policy, the Republic of Korea's policies and United States foreign policy are limited to those policies related to, or directly impacting on, the normalisation issue and, in particular, their influence on the negotiating position of successive Japanese governments.

---

Finance Ministry are still closed. For example, Ōkurashō rizaikyoku gaisaika hen, *Nikkan seikyūken mondai sankō shiryō*, Vol.1 and 2, are still unpublished.

<sup>14</sup> For example, *Gendai no me* is rather leftist, while *Sekai jōnaru* is more pro-government.



## MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The major research questions addressed by this thesis are:

1. Was Japanese East Asian policy similar to that of the United States?  
Did these two policies have any conflicts of interest and, if so, how did this influence the Japanese negotiating position?
2. In what way did the United States East Asian policy influence the Japanese negotiating position, if at all?
3. What was the major objective for the Japanese government in normalising relations with the Republic of Korea? How important was the normalisation issue in achieving the goals of Japan's East Asian policy? How were the East Asian policies of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States reflected in the negotiating position of the Japanese government?
4. What were the significant influences of Japanese domestic perspectives on the Japanese negotiating position? How were the interests of individuals and interest groups such as politicians, political factions, political parties, bureaucrats, business, intellectuals and community groups reflected?

This thesis examines the East Asian policies of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea, evaluates the influences of those policies on the treaty process and then places this in the context of the impact of Japanese domestic policy perspectives on the normalisation issues. Prior to the analysis, roles of bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking is overviewed.



## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS

This discussion of the Japanese policymaking process and its effects on the negotiations will be necessarily brief. The purpose is to demonstrate the major roles of politicians and senior bureaucrats in influencing the treaty negotiation process.

In order fully to understand the treaty negotiation process and the changing dynamics of the Japanese government's position in this series of negotiations, it is necessary briefly to overview the way policy was made during the period of the normalisation negotiations. The dynamics of the policy process, particularly the changing locus of policy control by politicians and bureaucrats, greatly influenced the way in which the Japanese negotiations were conducted.

This section analyses; 1) the relationships between bureaucrats and politicians; 2) whence the bureaucrats and politicians derived their power; and 3) how Japanese bureaucrats and politicians functioned at the time.

During the normalisation negotiations, political interest often coincided with bureaucratic interest, but sometimes these interests were in conflict. Politician-bureaucrat relations were complicated by the strong linkages established between politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party conservative faction and bureaucrats. A large numbers of ex-bureaucrats joined the conservative faction of the LDP and maintained strong links with the ministries with which they previously served.<sup>15</sup> The influence of ex-bureaucrats in the LDP was

---

<sup>15</sup> Johnson, Chalmers, *MITI and Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1982, p. 46

significant, but not sufficient to control the political agenda completely. Politicians did not dominate policy making either. Muramatsu and Krauss point out that the introduction of a democratic political system in postwar Japan did not necessarily establish the status and power of politician over the bureaucracy.<sup>16</sup>

There are three major views of politician-bureaucrat relations in postwar Japan; 1) the dominance of bureaucrats over politicians, 2) mutually supportive relations between bureaucrats and politicians; and, 3) the limitation of bureaucratic power by political power.

The first view is shared by Japan specialists who focus on the economic policy making process, such as Chalmers Johnson, and by those who believe that Japanese culture shaped bureaucratically oriented politics. Johnson argues for the dominance of the bureaucracy in Japan by pointing out that bureaucratic recommendations are almost free of constraint by politicians unless they clearly show the possibility of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) losing votes.<sup>17</sup> Okimoto argues that bureaucrats controlled politics through joining the Liberal Democratic Party on a large scale.<sup>18</sup> This constant flow of senior bureaucrats from the civil service to the LDP produced a class of 'bureaucratised' politicians who had an intimate understanding of public policy and who exercised State power at both a political and bureaucratic level.

---

<sup>16</sup> Muramatsu Michio and Krauss, Ellis S., 'Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan', in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.78, No.1, March 1984, p.128: They point out that it is difficult to clarify "whether the postwar democratic reforms have resulted in a bureaucracy that accepts the pluralistic rules of the democratic game, as seems to have happened in West Germany, or whether the prewar patterns of classical bureaucratic norms have remained entrenched, as they seem to have done in Italy".

<sup>17</sup> Johnson, op. cit., p.28

<sup>18</sup> Okimoto, Daniel I., 'Ex-Bureaucrats in the Liberal-Democratic Party', in eds Okimoto, Daniel I. and Rohlen, Thomas P., *Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society and Political Economy*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.187-190

By means of a cultural analysis of power dynamics in Japan, Pye argues that the pre-Meiji period feudal system was transformed to a 'modern bureaucratic state', where "Government has been more by administration than by an open political process".<sup>19</sup> Pye describes this system as a "bureaucratic state with a minimum of tension over authority and the character of power"<sup>20</sup>, where bureaucrats were able to change policy with little or no restraint in order to avoid crisis situations developing. A similar point is made by Pempel, who has called the bureaucratic nature of Japanese politics "creative conservatism".<sup>21</sup>

Ex-bureaucrats' knowledge and skills, as well as their ties with ministries, provided the LDP with politicians who had many advantages over other parties. They "...have given the ruling conservative party leadership ability, based on first hand experience in public administration, intimate knowledge of the policy-making processes, access to the best available information, and extensive contacts with elites in both public and private sectors".<sup>22</sup> Thus, the LDP's conservative factions, characterised by their bureaucratic origins, were more capable of adapting to the demands of the population than were opposition parties, which generally had very limited bureaucratic experience within their ranks.<sup>23</sup> During the period of the

<sup>19</sup> Pye, Lucian W., and Pye, Mary W., *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, Harvard University Press, 1985, p.180

<sup>20</sup> Pye, op. cit., p.180-1

<sup>21</sup> Pempel, T.J., *Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1982, p.307: Pempel argues that "many of the policies followed by the conservatives have been creatively astute and at least tolerably popular, while many of the policy alternatives posed by the opposition parties have been unimaginative at best and on occasion almost totally devoid of insight and popular support".

<sup>22</sup> Okimoto, op. cit., p.189-90

<sup>23</sup> Calder, Kent E., 'Kanryō vs Shomin: Contrasting Dynamics of Conservative Leadership in Postwar Japan', in ed MacDougall, Terry Edward, *Political Leadership in Contemporary Japan*, Center for Japanese Studies, Michigan, p.15: Calder analyses the length of rule by Prime Ministers and concludes that those who were ex-bureaucrats ruled almost three times longer than the ones who were not bureaucrats.



normalisation negotiations, all the Prime Ministers were ex-bureaucrats except Hatoyama and Ishibashi, who were Prime Ministers for a relatively short period.

The position which argues for mutually supportive relations between bureaucrats and politicians suggests that it was not only politicians who benefited from bureaucracy, but bureaucrats were also dependent on their close ties with the LDP for maintaining their power. From this view, bureaucrats needed to join the LDP because "bureaucracy depends on the political decisions and Diet votes of the politicians" under a democratic system.<sup>24</sup>

Reischauer suggests a corporatist model with business, bureaucracy and the LDP dominating the policy agenda.<sup>25</sup> The dynamics in this model are characterised by the isolation of policy making from the general population, opposition parties, and interest groups other than business on one hand, and the domination by tripartite linkages between business, bureaucracy and the LDP on the other hand. This view, however does not adequately explain the derivation of politician-bureaucrat conflict or how such conflict was resolved.

The third view is represented by Haley who argues that "a variety of institutional factors particular to Japan limit bureaucratic influence."<sup>26</sup> He argues for the inherent weakness of bureaucracy using the example of administrative guidance. This form of informal control by bureaucrats was central to bureaucratic power, since the bureaucracy was seen to "...lack many of the most basic regulatory powers required

---

<sup>24</sup> Reischauer, Edwin O., *The Japanese*, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo, 1977, p.292

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, p.290

<sup>26</sup> Haley, John O., 'Governance by Negotiation: A Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.13, No.2, Summer 1987, p.344

for effective formal enforcement".<sup>27</sup> Contrary to Johnson, who perceives the frequent use of administrative guidance as something which places bureaucrats "above the law"<sup>28</sup>, Haley's position suggests that bureaucrats cannot make business do things which it does not profit from. The compliance of businesses in an informal setting requires mutual rewards for both sides. Koh makes a similar point, arguing that cooperation with administrative guidance was effective as long as both bureaucrats and business profited from the control.<sup>29</sup> This notion applies to the business-bureaucracy ties in developing economic relations between Japan and South Korea, especially after 1960, although it does not include politicians' roles in the analysis.

Craig points out the possibility that "bureaucracy has been permitted to maintain its substantial autonomy and powers because of its willingness to act for the LDP".<sup>30</sup> Yakushiji also sees political power as a threat to bureaucratic power.<sup>31</sup> He explains the gradual increase in political power in terms of the increased salience of local "career politicians", who were opposed to central bureaucratic control. This argument is partially applicable to the periods between 1945 to 1965 because political influence was not strong during the 50s, but increased after 1960, particularly before and after the United States-Japan Security Treaty. However, large scale bureaucratic influence in policymaking during the 1950s is not explained by this perspective.

None of the above views by itself, sufficiently explains the influence of bureaucrats and politicians on policy making. Each perspective may

---

<sup>27</sup>        *ibid.*, p.354

<sup>28</sup>        Johnson, *op. cit.*, p.38

<sup>29</sup>        Koh, *op. cit.*, p.257-9

<sup>30</sup>        Craig, Albert M., 'Aspects of Government Bureaucracy', in ed Vogel, Ezra F., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p.20

<sup>31</sup>        Yakushiji Taizō, *Seijika vs kanryo: sapurai saido seijigaku no teishō*, Toyo keizai shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1987, pp.28-36

explain some part of politician-bureaucrat relations in policy making at a particular time or in relation to a particular issue. It could be the case that all three perspectives, which respectively argue the dominance of bureaucrats or politicians over policymaking, and the corporatist model of policymaking by LDP, bureaucrats and business, are valid to a certain extent. However, how these dynamics shifted should be analysed in order to examine who influenced policymaking at the particular time period during the normalisation negotiations. Thus, the next section illustrates how bureaucrats and politicians acquired and exercised power.

There are many views on the power of bureaucrats over policy, their ability to enforce their views and the centrality of their role in policymaking in Japan, especially in the postwar period.<sup>32</sup> The sources of bureaucratic power can mainly be explained by three factors; the historical legacy of bureaucratic power, Occupational policy, and the meritocratic civil service examination system.

Historically, the bureaucracy was established as an elite 'class' (*kanshi*) after the Meiji Restoration, placing it between ordinary citizens and the imperial family, including the emperor. In this way, the bureaucracy was seen as the translator of the imperial will, enforcing the policies of state authorised by the emperor.<sup>33</sup> Bureaucrats extended their power by using the authority of the emperor, and by building strong ties with

---

<sup>32</sup> Fukumoto, op. cit. Masamichi Inoki, 'The Civil Bureaucracy', in eds Ward, Robert E., and Rustow, Dankwart A., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964, pp.283-87. Spaulding, Robert M., Jr., *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971. Watanabe Yasuo, 'Kōmuin no kyaria', (The Career Patterns of Civil Servants), in ed Tsuji Kiyooki, *Gyōseigaku kōza, dai 2-kan: Gyōsei no rekishi* (a Lectures on Public Administration, vol.2: The History of Public Administration), Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1976, pp.111-60. Mori Hiroshi and Yazawa Shūjirō, *Kanryōsei no shihai*, Yūhikaku, Tokyo, 1981. Johnson, 1982. And also by Johnson, Chalmers, 'Japan: Who Governs?: An Essay on Official Bureaucracy', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.2, No.1, 1975, pp.21-28. Haley, op. cit. Yakushiji, op. cit., Campbell, op. cit.

<sup>33</sup> Tanaka, op. cit., pp.60-62



conglomerates (*zaibatsu*), which shaped the later (post-war) bureaucracy-capital nexus.<sup>34</sup> The imperial authority was superficial thus enabling the virtual rule of the country by "a coalition of *hanbatsu* (domain cliques) and court nobles"<sup>35</sup>. Royama Masamichi argues that the feudal system before the Meiji Restoration was replaced by the rule of the military and the bureaucracy.<sup>36</sup> Those two groups essentially ruled Japan until its defeat in World War II.

It is difficult easily to portray the immense power of the bureaucracy in prewar Japan and it may be too easy to dismiss this idea of a continuation of prewar bureaucratic power. To put this argument in perspective, Koh's comments are instructive:

"Generally speaking, power and prestige go hand in hand; hence despite the absence of survey data, one may surmise that bureaucrats in prewar Japan, symbols as well as wielders of awesome power, enjoyed high prestige....It is worth noting that bureaucrats may have been more feared than respected. Their arrogance was legendary, and tales of the abuse of bureaucratic power were legion. The well known phrase, *kanson minpi* (officials revered, citizens despised) not only summed up a major theme in the political culture of prewar Japan; it also epitomised the reality of bureaucratic dominance in Japanese society."<sup>37</sup>

Bureaucrats in postwar Japan not only dominated the policy making process and policy implementation, but also extended their influence

---

34      *ibid.*, p.73

35      Koh, *op. cit.*, p.14

36      Koh, B.C., *Japan's Administrative Elite*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989, p.14

37      Koh, *op. cit.*, pp.15-6



into the ruling party, the LDP. Craig argues that "Japanese bureaucrats ...do not look simply to the LDP".<sup>38</sup> "They see themselves as operating above politics in the national interest".<sup>39</sup> The enthusiasms of the bureaucracy in pursuing national goals seem to have been derived from their 'elitist' consciousness. Some attempts have been made to explain this greater role of bureaucrats in controlling policy in Japan by stating that it is a continuation from the bureaucratic system of prewar Japan. Koh argues that "the explicit linking of bureaucratic authority and imperial prerogatives" after the Meiji Restoration still maintain the elites status of bureaucrats.<sup>40</sup> He concludes that the bureaucrats' role in the rapid postwar industrialisation of the nation was crucial, and that their mobilisation of the population for national unity and success resembles the achievements of the modernised bureaucracy in Meiji Japan.<sup>41</sup>

Johnson points out that governmental authorities were called "those above" (*okami*).<sup>42</sup> Fukumoto argues similar points, saying that the name for bureaucrats, "civil servants" was not equal to perceptions of bureaucrats themselves, and elitist and authoritarian consciousness (*shihai ishiki, ken'i ishiki*) remained despite the Occupation reforms.<sup>43</sup> A continuation of these attitudes from prewar Japan is specifically described by Johnson as the replacement of "way of a warrior" (*bushidō*) to "way of the bureaucrats" (*kanryodō*).<sup>44</sup> "In addition to their status, the bureaucrats of modern Japan also inherited from the samurai something comparable to their code of ethics and their elite

---

38 Craig, op. cit., p.19: Craig mentioned that a bureaucrat told him that "from time to time, the bureaucracy is successful in opposing the policy directives of LDP organs".

39 ibid., p.19

40 Koh, op. cit., p.14

41 ibid., p.157

42 Johnson 1982, p.41

43 Fukumoto, op. cit., p.139

44 Johnson 1982, p.39-40

consciousness".<sup>45</sup> Thus they devoted themselves to the "national interest".

The Occupation policy of purging politicians and military officers, as well as conglomerates (*zaibatsu*) not only preserved, but strengthened bureaucratic power. Bureaucrats were the only group who substantially survived the purge by the Occupation.<sup>46</sup> Johnson estimated that "only forty-two higher officials (bureau chiefs and above) were purged from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry - the wartime Ministry of Munitions and only nine from the Ministry of Finance".<sup>47</sup>

The Occupation relied on the bureaucracy to carry out purges and other reforms, as well as for managing the recovery of the Japanese economy. It was therefore very dependent on the bureaucracy and consequently allowed officials substantially to retain their power, if not enhance it, in the absence of any strong domestic political constraints.<sup>48</sup> The Occupation authorities feared that major reforms in the bureaucracy would bring inefficiency, which would be a major obstacle to its reform program.<sup>49</sup> This logic is apparent when we look at the dissolution of conglomerates (*zaibatsu*) and the giving of economic functions to bureaucrats; functions which were "shared between the government and the *zaibatsu*" before the defeat of Japan.<sup>50</sup>

Another source of bureaucratic power is the extremely competitive selection criteria for bureaucrats. This meritocratic recruiting system

---

45      *ibid.*, p.38

46      Fukumoto, *op. cit.*, p.124. Maki, John M., 'The Role of Bureaucracy in Japan', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 20, December 1947, pp.397. Johnson 1975, pp.14-22. Johnson 1982, pp.44-46

47      Johnson 1982, pp.41-2

48      Koh, *op. cit.*, p.35: Koh points out that "the Occupation took the form of indirect rule...(therefore) the Japanese government was primarily responsible for implementing all policy directives emanating from SCAP".

49      Yakushiji, *op. cit.*, p.28

50      Johnson 1982, p.45

legitimises bureaucrats of the national government to conceive themselves as elite, therefore make them feel that they are responsible for, and capable of, guiding society. The national civil service examinations were extremely competitive, thus "those who survive the competition tend to be among the best that Japan's educational system has to offer to that country's prospective employers".<sup>51</sup> Those who passed the exam automatically thought of themselves as having entered the elite.<sup>52</sup> This elitist consciousness takes the form of a "sacrifice for the public good" mentality within ministries.<sup>53</sup> Itō Daiichi adds that many senior bureaucrats use their positions as a means of expressing their nationalism, thus strengthening their perceptions of themselves as not only working for the national interest, but perhaps being the best interpreters of it.<sup>54</sup> Since they feel that they 'rule' Japan, they engage themselves in tasks which deals with national interests, whether it is economic development, or foreign policy.

The major roles of bureaucrats are described by Haley as the making and implementation of policies.<sup>55</sup> The making of policies reflects bureaucratic influence on the legislative process.<sup>56</sup> The implementation of policies is pursued by using formal and informal methods. Formally, bureaucrats controlled advisory committees,<sup>57</sup> granting "permission", and allocation of resources by the budgetary process.<sup>58</sup> Informally, they exercised their power by using

---

51        *ibid.*, p.252

52        Johnson 1982, p.39

53        *ibid.*, p.39

54        Itō Daiichi, *Gendai nihon kanryōsei no bunseki*, Toyo University Press, Tokyo, 1980, p.20

55        Haley, *op. cit.*, p.344

56        Pempel, T.J., 'The Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.18, 1974, p.648. Also Fukumoto Tadao, *Kanryō*, Kobundō, Tokyo, p.142-3

57        Pempel 1974, p.648

58        Fukumoto, *op. cit.*, p.142-3



"administrative guidance".<sup>59</sup> Craig applies Weber's concept of bureaucracy, stating that Japanese bureaucrats are more involved in the legislative process, but are politically neutral in their objectives.<sup>60</sup>

Politicians' power, when compared to the immense power of bureaucrats, was limited when the Occupation Army left Japan having established new political arrangements. Moreover, many powerful politicians were purged as war criminals. Johnson documents that only "...approximately 40 percent of some 329 prewar and wartime politicians recently released from the ban against their holding public office were reelected to the Diet"<sup>61</sup> in the election of October 1952. They secured about 30 percent of the seats in the Diet.<sup>62</sup>

They were not only disadvantaged by the Occupation policy, but also lacked the historical legacy of power enjoyed by bureaucrats. Yakushiji argues that democracy was "grafted" onto Japan by the Occupation's political reforms, therefore, it did not function well from the onset.<sup>63</sup> He sees a contradiction in the Occupation policy, which on one hand preserved the strong central control by bureaucrats, but on the other hand attempted to introduce a pluralistic system by strengthening political power at the local level.<sup>64</sup> According to Yakushiji, this rise of local political power did not have a significant effect on the centralised control of bureaucrats until Tanaka Kakuei was elected in the 70s. In his view, this central control by bureaucrats was perceived as the basis of bureaucratic power of both bureaucrats within ministries and ex-bureaucrats in the LDP. Those two groups are supposed to function in a

---

<sup>59</sup>        *ibid.*, p.142-3

<sup>60</sup>        Craig, *op. cit.*, p.17-8: It is pointed out that majority of bills are drafted by bureaucrats in the ministries, which is by Weber's term "political".

<sup>61</sup>        Johnson 1982, p.46

<sup>62</sup>        *ibid.*, p.46

<sup>63</sup>        Yakushiji, *op. cit.*, pp.28-36

<sup>64</sup>        *ibid.*, p.29

very similar way, and ex-bureaucrats in the LDP are described as "managers" rather than "politicians".<sup>65</sup>

If ex-bureaucrats in the LDP and bureaucrats in the ministries were functioning in similar ways, as Yakushiji suggested, how can conflict between the LDP politicians and bureaucrats be explained? It is possible that these conflicts indicate that the ties between bureaucrats and politicians who were ex-bureaucrats were not as strong as some suggest. It could be suggested that bureaucratic dominance in policy making was gradually superseded by the rising power of politicians, including ex-bureaucrats. Also, a shift of focus from security issues to economic issues in the treaty negotiations might have reduced the control of bureaucrats and increased political influence.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the influence of bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking, and their power dynamics depended on the time and the issues. Inoguchi stated in 1988 that bureaucratic dominance of policymaking was no longer applicable.<sup>67</sup> Haley observed that the "...power of the bureaucracy has declined steadily during the postwar period".<sup>68</sup> The position of ex-bureaucrats as politicians would inevitably have altered their priorities, which then would probably, at least to some degree, have conflicted with the

---

<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, p.28-36: He argues that ex-bureaucrats had information gathering functions which enabled rule from the centre by LDP and bureaucrats. This central rule is considered non-political, therefore it created a "political vacuum", while political power was concentrated at the local electoral level.

<sup>66</sup> Reischauer, *op. cit.*, p.290-2: He argues that "During the period when decisions on industrial growth policies were the major ones being made by the Japanese government, the particularly powerful pressure group of big business did indeed have a specially significant role in the political process." Thus implies that economic priority in policy orientation gives power to politicians. He also points out that only the Foreign Ministry lacked Advisory Boards in 1972, thus popular participation was not reflected in foreign policy as much as in other fields of policies.

<sup>67</sup> Inoguchi Tadashi, 'Bureaucrats and Politicians: shifting Influence', in eds. Okimoto, Daniel I., and Rohlen, Thomas P., *Inside the Japanese Systems: Reading on Contemporary Society and Political Economy*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1988, pp.185-6: He suggests that bureaucracy dominated decision making process during 1940 to 1960s.

<sup>68</sup> Haley, *op. cit.*, p.344. Also Krauss, Ellis S., 'Political Economy: Policymaking and Industrial Policy in Japan', *Political Science and Politics*, March 1992, p.47: Krauss supports this point saying that bureaucratic power was "probably at its height in the first twenty years after WWII".

interests of bureaucrats in ministries. In addition, factional struggles within the LDP, especially the conflicts between the mainstream conservative faction represented by ex-bureaucrats, and the anti-mainstream factions (*tōjinha*) might also have reduced bureaucratic power.<sup>69</sup>

The reason why bureaucrat-politician relations shifted from a supportive relationship to a more conflictive one, or the shift from bureaucratic dominance in policy making to the increased influence of politicians on the negotiations, also depended on the issue.<sup>70</sup> The shift in focus from security issues to economic issues during the negotiation period implies that domination by the bureaucracy in policymaking was replaced by the rise of political power. Political interest in the normalisation issue increased because of the detention of fishermen, the United States-Japan Security Alliance issue, and by the developing economic ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea. These issues perhaps "politicised" the decision making process, and accordingly, over the course of the negotiation, reduced bureaucratic influence and increased political intervention in the negotiations.

---

<sup>69</sup> Johnson, op. cit., pp.46-7: Johnson points out that those two factions compete against each other.

<sup>70</sup> Campbell, Creighton John, 'Bureaucratic Primacy: Japanese Policy Communities in an American Perspective', *Governance*, Vol.2, No.1, January 1989, p.12. See also Craig, op. cit., p.20: Craig argues that politicians gain control over the issues which are politically sensitive.



## 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EAST ASIAN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1951-1965

During the period between 1951 and 1965, when the normalisation treaty was under negotiation, American East Asian policy underwent a major shift around 1960. This shift greatly influenced both Japan's and South Korea's East Asian policies. Pae Sung Moun describes the dynamics of United States, Japanese and Korean policies as a "Bipolar-Hierarchical System" in the 1950s, and as a "Loose Bipolar-Mixed Hierarchical System"<sup>71</sup> in the 1960s, reflecting the changes in the multilateral relationship over this period. Two poles in his models locates Japan and Korea on one side, and United States on the other side. He argues that the 1960s showed the decline of United States power, which encouraged Japan and the Republic of Korea to exercise more independent policy stances than was possible under the stricter more hegemonic United States policies of the 1950s.<sup>72</sup>

### 1.1. The East Asian Policies of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea During the Korean War

The establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, as well as the success of the atomic bomb experiments by the USSR in August of the same year determined the direction of United States East Asian policy for the following decade. The core of this policy thereafter became "the containment project, providing security against both the enemy and the ally; and the hegemonic project, providing for American leverage over the necessary resources of our industrial rivals".<sup>73</sup> It meant the containment of the PRC and the USSR and

---

<sup>71</sup> Pae Sung Moun, 'The Two Koreans and the Northeast Asian International Subsystem' in *Korea and World Affairs*, vol.5, no.2, Summer 1981, pp. 203-217

<sup>72</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 204-217

<sup>73</sup> Cumings, Bruce, *op. cit.*, p. 88



American hegemonic projection towards Japan and other Asian countries. Pointing out the fact that the United States sent troops to Taiwan on June 27 and to Saigon on August 10 after the Korean War broke out in 1950, Hatada argues that the United States' policy towards Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam was integrated after this period.<sup>74</sup>

Hegemonic projection was pursued by the United States in order to stop the expansion of communism through United States' exploitation of political and economic crises.

The United States considered it necessary to stabilise the world economy by integrating Europe and Asia around the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan respectively.<sup>75</sup> With the emergence of the PRC, Japan acquired strategic importance for the United States, which subsequently reversed its initial policy of not assisting Japan's post-war economic recovery.<sup>76</sup> Lee Jongwon argues that the United States established a system for Japan to profit from American military supply demands in East Asia before the start of the Korean War.<sup>77</sup> The outbreak of the Korean War and following conflicts in Asia contributed greatly to the economic recovery of Japan by earning "foreign exchange through the special procurement of goods and services required by the United States armed forces".<sup>78</sup>

After joining the Korean War, the United States concluded the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1951, following the conclusion of the

---

<sup>74</sup> Hatada Shigeo, op. cit., p. 11

<sup>75</sup> Lee Jongwon, 'Sengo Beikoku no kyokutō seisaku to kankoku no datsu shokuminchi ka', in *Iwanami kōza kindai nihon to shokuminchi 8 ajia no reisen to shokuminchika*, eds. Ōe Shinobu et al., Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1993, pp. 6-7

<sup>76</sup> Okita Saburō, *The Developing Economies and Japan: Lessons in Growth*, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 138-139

<sup>77</sup> Lee Jongwon, op. cit., pp. 14-15

<sup>78</sup> Okita Saburō, op. cit., p. 140. Even after the Korean War, "Japan continued to gain procurement earnings in subsequent years from the United States armed forces stationed in Japan and her neighbouring areas which maintained an annual average of nearly 500 million dollars."

San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were not involved. This Security Treaty allowed United States troops to remain in Japan after the Occupation, thereby "committing the United States to Japan's defence".<sup>79</sup> During the Korean War, this treaty enabled the United States to use Japan as a military base. It seems apparent that Japan's defence and economic recovery were the most crucial goals for the United States in building a defence against the expansion of communism in East Asia.<sup>80</sup> The United States pursued this goal by providing Japan with the mechanism to profit from both United States and Republic of Korea military requirements, as well as providing a 'free-ride' on United States funded defence of Japan, through its many Japanese military bases. For the United States, the push to persuade Japan to rearmament gave way to the drive for the economic recovery of Japan at this stage.

Japanese East Asian policy after 1951 was greatly influenced by the Occupation policy in Japan. Until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on April 28, 1952, Japan was virtually under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.<sup>81</sup> Subsequently, the Japan-United States Security Treaty became the basis of Japanese East Asian policy. Japan played a major, but indirect role, in the Korean War, supporting the Republic of Korea and the United States, principally as a supply base.

Additionally, the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself determined Japan's relations with other Asian nations to a certain degree. Article 4 (a) of

<sup>79</sup> Reischauer, Edwin O., *The Japanese*, Tuttle & Company, Tokyo, 1978, p. 341

<sup>80</sup> Cumings, Bruce, op. cit., p. 98. Cumings argues that Korea's significance for the United States was primarily for the security for Japan.

<sup>81</sup> Ōno Katsumi, *Kasumigaseki gaikō - sono dentō to hitobito*, Nihon keizai shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1978, pp. 208-209. Ōno was a Foreign Ministry official (*sanjikan*) in the first round normalisation talks. According to Ōno, SCAP-GHQ ordered the Japanese Foreign Ministry to prohibit direct contact with any foreign country before the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

the treaty stated that the settlement of property claims, either by Japan or to Japan, is to be arranged between Japan and authorities of countries which Japan negotiates with. It stated that property claims "shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities."<sup>82</sup> Negotiations on normalising relations of Japan with Taiwan and the Republic of Korea both started in 1951. Although Prime Minister Yoshida disagreed with the American policy of recognising the Taiwan regime, American pressure prevailed and Japan-Taiwanese relations were normalised the next year. Considering that a trade agreement was concluded between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1949, the lack of diplomatic relations between the two nations did not interfere significantly in basic Japanese-South Korean trade.

Since the start of the negotiations with Asian countries, Japan's prime interest was to take time over the negotiations and to soften the claims against Japan as much as it could.<sup>83</sup> Tanaka argues that Japan profited from the Cold War conflict because the normalisation treaty with Taiwan was concluded by the abandonment of the property claim against Japan by the Chiang Kai-shek government, in response to both direct American pressure and a strong desire to cement anti-communist alliances.<sup>84</sup>

Japanese trade policy during the Korean War was basically in line with United States East Asian policy since Japan could profit economically

---

<sup>82</sup> Appendix 'Treaty of Peace with Japan' in Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 313

<sup>83</sup> Tanaka Hiroshi, 'Nihon no sengo sekinin to asia - sengo hoshō to rekishi ninshiki', in *Iwanami kōza kindai nihon to shokuminchi 8 ajia no reisen to shokuminchika*, eds. Ōe Shinobu et al., Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1993, p. 200

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, 1993, p. 200



by following this policy line.<sup>85</sup> However, the first unofficial trade agreement between the Peoples Republic of China and Japan after the end of World War II was signed in May 1952. This implies that the primary goal for Japan was the reconstruction of its economy at least partially through the re-establishment of those profitable trading relationships with neighbouring states that had preceded the Second World War.<sup>86</sup>

East Asian Policy of the Republic of Korea was greatly influenced by the Korean War. The War made the Republic of Korea more strategically important for the United States,<sup>87</sup> thus increased the support to the Republic Korea militarily and financially. Syngman Rhee, whose regime was suffering a legitimacy crisis, was saved by the outbreak of the war. The Rhee regime secured United States military aid (through the agency of the United Nations), therefore securing the continuation of the regime itself. The Republic of Korea's East Asian policy during the Korean War was fundamentally a policy of survival. After the PRC's involvement began in the Korean War, the Republic of Korea adopted an anti-PRC stance as well. When it came to relations with Japan, there was a continuation of the strong anti-Japanese feeling which derived from the Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Although Syngman Rhee was opposed to the idea of an alliance with Japan, he

---

<sup>85</sup> Ōno Katsumi, op. cit., pp. 210-211. Ōno observed that Prime Minister Yoshida was not 'necessarily a puppet of America, but knew that Japan would benefit mostly by following the United States policy'.

<sup>86</sup> *ibid.*, p. 212. He concludes that despite the basic alliance of Japan with the United States, Japanese economic interests were pursued through diplomacy, principally that concerned with trade and business and did not rely on any strategic policy pressure derived from the alliance.

<sup>87</sup> Kil Soong-Hoom, 'Japan in American-Korean Relations', in *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, p. 155. According to Kil, "Of the sixteen nations receiving American economic aid in April 1946, Korea was listed fifteenth in strategic importance."; Also see Han Sung-Joo, 'Policy Towards the United States', in *The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Han Sung-joo, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, p. 144. He said, "South Korea was compelled to play only a small role fitting the overall United States foreign policy. However, the situation changed drastically with the outbreak of the Korean War."

accepted a trade agreement with Japan and the Japan-United States Security Treaty.<sup>88</sup> The pragmatic stance of the South Korean regime at this time was to conform as much as necessary to American and Japanese policy initiatives so as to retain allies with which to fight the DPRK.

## 1.2. The East Asian Policy of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea from 1953-1960

The United States East Asian policy during this period was characterised by the maintenance of the containment of communist expansion and hegemonic economic projection towards Japan and other Asian countries, particularly Taiwan and South Korea. The United States' commitment to the defence of the Republic of Korea after the Korean War was reflected in its military and economic support.<sup>89</sup> After the truce was signed between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK, a security treaty with the United States was concluded in 1953. This was followed by the Taiwan-United States Security Treaty in the following year.

Japan's economic and military cooperation with other free-world Asian countries was also promoted by the United States. Yoshikazu Sakamoto argues that "America regarded Japanese cooperation with

---

<sup>88</sup> Hahn Bae-Ho, 'Major Issues in the American-Korean Alliance', in *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, p. 98. "Rhee complained about using Japanese technicians and engineers brought to Korea during the Korean War for repair work by the American military commanders in Korea." Rhee even went further to say that "Korean people are worried more about Japan than the Soviet Union". p. 98

<sup>89</sup> Okonogi Masao, 'Chōsen hantō o meguru kokusai seiji', in *Chōsen hantō no seiji keizai kōzō*, ed. Mitani Shizuo, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1983, p.133. According to Okonogi, the United States spent \$US180 million on the Korean War. He also estimates that \$US2 million for economic aid and more than \$US3 million for military aid was paid annually between 1950 to 1960; see also Hahn Bae-Ho, op. cit., p. 96. "...during the seven-year period between 1954 and 1960 the United States provided South Korea with a total of \$US2.6 billion in economic grants-in-aid, which is equivalent to some 8.6 percent of the total South Korean gross national product for the period. Moreover, the United States provided a total of \$US1.2 billion in military aid (grants) during the same period."

South Korea as the key to reinforcing her moral and military position in East Asia because, among other things, it was absolutely vital to the effective pursuit of the United States' military policy against China".<sup>90</sup>

Although the encouragement of ties among Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan was an important part of its East Asian policy, the central interest of the United States after the Korean War was still to reconstruct the Japanese economy and to bring about the remilitarisation of Japan within the American global strategic framework. The American support for the Japanese economic recovery also continued and, in comparison to Korea or Taiwan, as a priority. At the meeting prior to the signing of the United States-Republic of Korea Security Treaty, US Secretary of State "Dulles was suggesting that Rhee should go along with the American plan to use part of the funds designated for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy for developing the war-devastated Japanese economy".<sup>91</sup> This suggestion obviously did not please the Koreans who saw this as another example of Japanese resurgence at their expense and, in all probability, reinforced the hostility of the Rhee regime to normalising relations with Japan. Rhee expressed the fear that "if Japan is built up with the money to be used for Korea as the producer, and if the other countries in Asia, including Korea, remains as buyers, the others will become 'slaves' to Japan".<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Japanese-South Korea Cooperation: Its Implications in the Context of the Sino-American Confrontation', in *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, vol. IV, no.2, August 1966, p. 54. He also says that "America regarded Japanese cooperation with South Korea as the key to reinforcing her moral and military position in East Asia because, among other things, it was absolutely vital to effective pursuit of United States military policy against China."

<sup>91</sup> Hahn Bae-Ho, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

<sup>92</sup> ibid., p. 98. Rhee knew the importance of Japan to the United States but thought it derived from Japanese skill to draw out American sympathy towards Japan pointing out that "the Japanese are extremely clever in handling Western psychology".



At the same time, the United States attempted to further remilitarise Japan. Richard Nixon, then U.S. Vice-President, made a statement in 1953 that it was a mistake for the United States to have forced upon Japan the non-aggression article of the Japanese constitution.<sup>93</sup> The revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty was started in 1955 with the aim of moving Japan towards accepting more responsibility for her own defence. The claim is advanced in some Japanese circles that at the same time, the establishment of the North East Asian Treaty Organisation, a counterpart of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), was attempted.<sup>94</sup> This proposed alliance would have tied Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and the United States into a mutual security treaty. However, the dynamics of the relationships between the proposed allies, particularly between Japan and her former colonies, was such that the proposal did not succeed, if, indeed, it was ever made in this form.<sup>95</sup> A key factor in this failure was the continuing suspicion of a resurgence of Japanese military power by the other Asian nations and, in terms of the Korea-Japan relationship, continuing animosity from the Koreans and a continuation of Japanese colonial attitudes towards Korea.<sup>96</sup>

Japanese East Asian policy from after the Korean War to 1960 was focused on the acquisition of status in the international community and the pursuit of economic advantage within the framework of the

---

<sup>93</sup> Hatada Shigeo, op. cit., p. 11

<sup>94</sup> Hatada Takashi et al., op. cit., p. 71; A North Korean article suggests that the Fourth Round Talks were held to facilitate the United States creating the North East Asian Treaty Organisation, following in the path of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation, which was concluded on September 8th, 1954. This article also argues that the United States attempted to make Japan support South Korea economically in place of the United States from around this period; see Chōsen daigakkō, *Kan-nichi kaidan no honshitsu ni tsuite - sono keika to haikei ni kansuru kōsatsu*, Chōsen daigakkō, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 6-47; Chang Young-Gil also points out that an American reduction of responsibilities in East Asia required closer ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea. See Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>95</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 235-6

<sup>96</sup> Hahn Bae-Ho, op. cit., p. 98. Rhee expressed South Korean's fear that "Japan is aiming at its old colonial ideas."



Japan-United States Security Alliance. Japan's desire to acquire status in the international community was mainly realised by joining the United Nations and other international organisations into which the United States sponsored it. Following the partial normalisation of relations with the USSR in 1956, Japan became a member of United Nations, and then became a U.N. Security Council non-permanent member in 1957. Security policy during this period shows that Japan considered it necessary to rearm, but decided to keep a small-scale defence force so that it could devote the majority of its budget to economic development.<sup>97</sup> Here, we can see a conflict of interest between the United States' policy objectives and Japanese interests. Japan finally compromised to develop a small-scale defence force, initially created under the Occupation, into the Self Defence Forces in 1954, and agreed to revise the Japan-United States Security Treaty in August 1955 to reflect this. Despite American pressure to amend the security treaty since then, Japan has had no intention of giving up its 'free-ride' on the United States for its defence as guaranteed by the 1951 security treaty. The United States tried but gave up an attempt to further amend the security treaty in the spring of 1957.<sup>98</sup>

Another tactic taken by Japanese governments for developing the economy was the tough bargaining stance taken in respect of the reparations and property claims against Japan by nations which were the victims of Japanese war time aggression. The Japanese Finance

---

<sup>97</sup> Okita Saburo, 1980, p. 115. He estimates that if military expenditure at prewar levels had continued, the economy would have grown at 2 percent less annually than was actually achieved by adoption of this policy; also see Gordon, Bernard K., 'Japan: Searching Once Again', in *Asia Pacific in the New World Politics*, ed. Hsiung, James C., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1993, p. 55. Gordon points out three aims of Japanese economic development, "foreign markets for Japan's products; minimal spending for defence...; and, finally, a big brother."

<sup>98</sup> Kil, Soong-Hoom, 1984, p. 158. He also argues that if the Japan-United States Security Treaty had been amended then, there was a possibility that the United States might have withdrawn its troops from the Republic of Korea and the Japan-South Korea Security Treaty might have replaced American troops in Korea with Japanese troops as the guarantor of South Korean sovereignty.

Ministry has said that Japan succeeded in reducing the payments made for reparation and property claims to other Asian countries by taking a long time for bargaining and settlement of these claims.<sup>99</sup> Property claim settlements only began in 1954, beginning with the settlement with Burma in 1954, followed by Thailand in 1955, the Philippines in 1956, Indonesia and Laos in 1958 and Cambodia and South Vietnam in 1959. The settlement of property claims also brought economic advantages to Japan through the claims, in part, being tied to payment in goods and services sourced from Japan as aid rather than through cash or cash convertible payments such as gold. Furthermore, Japan could use those reparation payments or the economic aid for development of economic ties between those countries as an industry stimulant, once it could afford it.<sup>100</sup> In this context, it is important to note that the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation negotiations continued during this period and that, of all the nations (other than Taiwan) making claims against Japan, Korea had the longest history of Japanese control and exploitation. It could therefore be expected to make the largest claims.

Japanese interest in developing its economy drove Japan in foreign policy directions which took it outside the tight boundaries tacitly imposed through the Japan-United States Security Alliance sphere. Prime Minister Hatoyama proclaimed an "autonomous people's diplomacy"<sup>101</sup> in December 1954, and attempted the development of economic ties with communist countries. Japanese trade with the PRC during the Hatoyama government dramatically increased by 50% from 1954 to 1955.<sup>102</sup> Negotiations for normalisation of relations between Japan and the USSR began in 1955, and were concluded the following

---

99 Tanaka Hiroshi, *op. cit.*, p. 200

100 *ibid.*, p. 200

101 Chang Young-Gil, *op. cit.*, p. 76

102 *ibid.*, p. 77

year. Japanese contact with the DPRK started in 1955, following the establishment of the Japan-DPRK Association and the Japan-DPRK Trading Association.<sup>103</sup> When the Republic of Korea banned trade with Japan in August, as a response to Japan's pro-DPRK stance, the Japanese government announced a ban on trade with the DPRK.<sup>104</sup> This reaction to criticism from one of its neighbours allied with it to the United States, provides some indication of the limits of Japanese foreign policy within the American security policy framework. Japan also supported the United States in its tactic of only admitting the Republic of Korea, and excluding the DPRK, at the United Nations General Assembly in 1956.<sup>105</sup> The Japanese logic here was probably to show Japan's commitment to the Japan-United States Security Alliance framework, since Japan profited more from this than trade with the DPRK.

The birth of the Kishi government, with the assumption of power by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1957, brought a major change in Japanese foreign policy. The idea of the Republic of Korea as the front-line of Japanese security against communism re-emerged during this period,<sup>106</sup> and was known as the *Pusan akahata ron* (Red Flags at Pusan Theory).<sup>107</sup> Also, the "autonomous people's policy" pushed by Hatoyama was overtaken by the pro-United States stance of the conservative faction of the LDP.<sup>108</sup> As a consequence of this change in Japanese politics, the revision of the Japan-United States Security

---

103 Ko Jun-Sok, *Sengo chō-nichi kankeishi - kaihō chōsen to nihon*, Shakai hyōron sha, Tokyo, 1987, p. 148

104 *ibid.*, p. 68

105 *loc. cit.*

106 Kil Soong-Hoom, *op. cit.*, p. 154. The idea that the Korean peninsula was the security front for Japan existed in the Meiji era, when the Korean peninsula was referred to as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan".

107 Uchida Kenzō et al., 'Nikkan hijyun o meguru seiji Jyōkyō', in *Gendai no me*, October 1965, p. 70

108 *ibid.*, p. 69



Treaty was restarted by Prime Minister Kishi, and was concluded in 1960.

In South Korea, President Rhee's anti-DPRK, pro-United States stance was maintained throughout the period between 1954-1960. However, Rhee's position towards Japan shows continuing ambiguity, although his basic distrust of Japan continued. After the conclusion of the Republic of Korea-United States Security Treaty, the United States proposed that the Republic of Korea cooperate in the establishment of a Pacific security alliance which would include Japan.<sup>109</sup> This alliance is frequently referred to in Japanese opposition and left-wing circles as the North East Asian Treaty Organisation, although Reischauer comments that this term was unknown by American leaders.<sup>110</sup> Rhee, however, refused to cooperate, fearing that the Japanese would dominate Asia again. As an option to the proposed alliance, Rhee proposed a North East Asia Alliance with countries such as the Philippines, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan, but excluding Japan.<sup>111</sup> It was aimed at preventing both the invasion of communism and economic neo-colonialism by Japan in the region. This proposal, which had some merit, failed mainly because the Republic of Korea's status in the international community was very low.<sup>112</sup>

### 1.3. East Asian Policy of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea from 1960-1965

---

<sup>109</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 235-236

<sup>110</sup> Reischauer, op. cit., p. 349. Reischauer comments: "The term (NEATO), though often referred to by Japanese leftists, was actually unknown to the American leaders of the time." He further comments that it would have been improbable to replicate SEATO as it had been an obvious failure and had, by the mid-1960's become inactive. The term NEATO, if it existed at all, is obviously not significant outside Japan as it fails to be mentioned in either generalist texts (eg. Mackerras, C. ed. *Eastern Asia: An Introductory History*) or specialist texts (eg. Lone, S. and McCormack, G. *Korea Since 1850*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1993)

<sup>111</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 236

<sup>112</sup> loc. cit.

1960 saw major change in the United States' East Asian policy. The rigid bipolar nature of the United States-Soviet conflict in the 1950's was replaced by the rising influence of smaller powers within each bloc. In the Soviet bloc, the Sino-Soviet dispute<sup>113</sup> and the Cuban Crisis in 1962 altered the "bipolar and intractable nature"<sup>114</sup> of power dynamics. The United States, suffering from an economic crisis partially bought on by maintaining enormous military expenditures<sup>115</sup> altered its hegemonic projects around this period. The Mutual Security Agreement Act in 1951, to give direct military and economic aid to both Japan and South Korea through the provision of goods, was replaced with the Development Loan Fund in 1957, which assisted Japanese and South Korean economic development through the provision of loans, legalised by the Overseas Assistance Act in 1961.<sup>116</sup>

Despite its financial difficulties, the American need for hegemonic and economic policies to succeed increased because of the situation in Vietnam and the Republic of Korea. In Vietnam, the pro-United States President Diem was assassinated, and in the Republic of Korea instability continued following the overthrow of Syngman Rhee in 1960. At the beginning of the 1960s, the United States not only attempted to attack communism in Vietnam, but also considered it necessary to secure the non-communist regime in the Republic of Korea as a necessary part of its containment policy.<sup>117</sup>

113 Okonogi Masao, op. cit., p. 135. He argues that the Sino-Soviet dispute was triggered by the first Sino-Indian dispute in 1959 and the termination of soviet economic and technical assistance to the PRC in 1960.

114 Cumings, op. cit., p. 87

115 Ishikawa Shigeru. et al., op. cit., pp. 21-22

116 Kasai Nobusachi, 'Nikkan keizai kankei no henshen - izon to jiritsu no sōkoku', in *Posuto reisen no Chōsen Hantō*, ed. Okonogi Masao, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1994, p. 328

117 Hatada Shigeo, op. cit., p. 14

What was essential to this policy was to integrate Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and Vietnam as a crescent of anti-communist regimes confronting communist Chinese expansionism. In this context, the American encouragement for Japan to strengthen ties with other American aligned Asian nations from the beginning of the 1960s could be closely linked to the situation in Vietnam.

The United States, facing financial problems, could pursue further military involvement in Asia if shared some of the United States's burdens by strengthening ties with other U.S. aligned nations in Asia. In this respect, normalisation between Japan and the Republic of Korea was strongly advocated by the United States from around 1960. The Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 4, 1964 further involved the United States in Vietnam, thus making it even more urgent from the American perspective, that all its allied states in Northeast Asia have fully normalised relations. This would subsequently promote American led economic hegemony in the region and, hopefully, further relieve the United States of some of the financial burden of regional defence.

Japanese East Asian policy during this period shows the continuation of its economic development-centred policy begun during the 1950s. The anti-communist pro-United States stance was also continued from the beginning of the Kishi government from 1957, although this did not extend to curtailing trade with the communist bloc. The conclusion of the Japan-United States Security Alliance in 1960 by Prime Minister Kishi enabled Prime Ministers Ikeda and Satō to expand Japan's role beyond the rigid Japan-United States bipolar structure. Since Japan overwhelmingly profited from the United States' trade with Japan during the 1950s, the economic crisis in the



United States also forced Japan to find alternative trading partners. In order to achieve this economic goal, Prime Minister Ikeda proclaimed Japan's new foreign policy, "separation of politics and economy", which attempted to separate Japan's political stance and its economic relations with free-world and communist nations.<sup>118</sup>

The South Korean East Asian policy after 1960 showed a dramatic shift from that of the Rhee regime. The anti-Japanese stance of Rhee was replaced by the pro-Japanese policy of Chang Myŏn and Park Chung Hee. The Chang Myŏn government proposed the establishment of an East Asian Alliance, with members including the Republic of Korea, Japan, the United States, Taiwan and the Philippines, dramatically altering the proposal previously advanced by the Rhee administration. Under Park Chung Hee, Japan and the Republic of Korea reached an agreement on military cooperation in October 1962, followed by a United States-Republic of Korea announcement supportive of an early rapprochement between Japan and South Korea on August 17 and October 1, 1964. In the same year<sup>119</sup> President Park Chung Hee promised to send South Korean troops to Vietnam in February 1965, at the request of President Johnson of the United States. Han Sung-Joo argues that the Republic of Korea's involvement in the Vietnam War suggests that South Korea's security was not really guaranteed by Japan (as its mutual defence treaty would suggest) and the Republic of Korea attempted to stop the "weakening of the United States security

---

<sup>118</sup> Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 124. Ikeda announced "cooperation with the free nations in economic and political matters, a United Nations-centred diplomacy, and an Afro-Asian orientation." Also see, Pae Sung Moun op. cit., pp. 210- 216. "Japan's trade with China continued to rise during the 1960s"; and Japan also "increased trade with the Soviet Union".

<sup>119</sup> Okonogi Masao, op. cit., p. 137; also see Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Japanese-South Korean Cooperation: Its Implications in the Context of the Sino-American Confrontation,' *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, Vol. IV, No. 2, August 1966, p.54. Sakamoto argues that, the United States "during the last two weeks of September 1964...openly attempted to facilitate normalization talks at that particular time, not simply because the Park regime faced a serious financial crisis, but more significantly because enormous Sino-American tensions had arisen following the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and because Washington anticipated that China would conduct a nuclear test in the autumn."

commitment in Korea"<sup>120</sup> by providing troops to the United States to support its efforts in Vietnam.

The argument that United States East Asian policy was the most influential factor in the normalisation negotiations between Japan and the Republic of Korea seems to stand on several different bases. For example: (1) The pre-First Round Talks, and the first and second rounds of negotiation were initiated and supported by the United States during the Korean War; (2) There was no significant benefit or need for the United States to normalise relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea after the Korean War to the beginning of the 1960s, therefore there was no significant support for the normalisation by the United States during this period; (3) The changing international environment in the mid 1960s and the urgency for the United States to normalise relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, to support its security concerns, resulted in strong United States pressure on both Japan and the Republic of Korea, shortly followed by the conclusion of the treaty.

On the other hand, the Korean perspective seem to emphasise the point that the regime change in the Republic of Korea eliminated Rhee's anti-Japanese stance, which therefore resulted in the eventual conclusion of the treaty. However, an overview of the East Asian policies of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea seems to suggest that Japanese East Asian policy was based on different objectives from that of the United States and the Republic of Korea. In the next three chapters the influences of United States East Asian policy and the Republic of Korea's pro-Japanese stance on the Japanese

---

<sup>120</sup> Han Sung-Joo, 'Policy Towards the United States', 1985, p. 150

negotiating position at the normalisation talks are re-evaluated. Also, the impact of Japanese domestic perspectives will be examined.

During the Korean War, the United States continued to pressure both Japan and the Republic of Korea to negotiate the normalisation issue. South Korea was also eager to settle the issue to its advantage despite Rhee's anti-Japanese feelings.<sup>121</sup> The negotiating position taken by the Japanese, however, was to avoid the resolution of the normalisation issue at this point; a tactic it pursued throughout the preliminary talks and the First and Second Round Talks.

## 2.1. Preparatory Talks

Preparatory talks prior to the First Round Talks for the normalisation treaty were held because of an order given by SCAP to the Japanese.<sup>122</sup> The Korean negotiator Kim Dong-ju wrote in his memoir that the Republic of Korea side had been asking for SCAP intervention in order to solve the problem of the legal status of Koreans in Japan. SCAP responded by ordering the Japanese to attend the preparatory round of talks.<sup>123</sup> The negotiation session was arranged through SCAP in Japan, since Japan was still under Occupation control.

Here we can see that the Korean interest was slightly different from that of the United States. For South Korea, the request for the United States to support the opening of negotiations with Japan was a consideration of attempts to obtain an advantage over Japan as relations became more normalised following the conclusion of the Six

<sup>121</sup> Kim Dong-ju, op. cit., p. 243-244.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 18. He is one of the few negotiators who dealt with the normalisation issue throughout the 11 years; see also Chōshichi Kurokiaka, *Korei jōshi no shōshi*, Chōshichi Kurokiaka, Tokyo, 1955, p. 8; also, Lee Jongwon, op. cit., p. 18. Chung says that the talk was initiated by "General Marshall B. Ridgway, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan, and his diplomatic adviser, Mr. William Sebald". See Chung Yung-Gil, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>123</sup> Kim Dong-ju, op. cit., pp. 243-244.



## 2: NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR

During the Korean War, the United States continued to pressure both Japan and the Republic of Korea to negotiate the normalisation issue. South Korea was also eager to settle the issue to its advantage, despite Rhee's anti-Japanese feelings.<sup>121</sup> The negotiating position taken by the Japanese, however, was to avoid the resolution of the normalisation issue at this point; a tactic it pursued throughout the preliminary talks and the First and Second Round Talks.

### 2.1. Preparatory Talks

Preparatory talks prior to the First Round Talks for the normalisation treaty were held because of an order given by SCAP to the Japanese.<sup>122</sup> The Korean negotiator Kim Dong-Jo wrote in his memoir that the Republic of Korea side had been asking for SCAP intervention in order to solve the problem of the legal status of Koreans in Japan. SCAP responded by ordering the Japanese to attend the preparatory round of talks.<sup>123</sup> The negotiation session was arranged through SCAP in Japan, since Japan was still under Occupation control.

Here we can see that the Korean interest was slightly different from that of the United States. For South Korea, the request for the United States to support the opening of negotiations with Japan was a continuation of attempts to obtain an advantage over Japan as relations became more normalised following the conclusion of the San

---

<sup>121</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 243-244

<sup>122</sup> *ibid.*, p.18. He is one of the few negotiator who dealt with the normalisation issue throughout its 14 years; see also Gendaishi kenkyūsho hen, *Nikkan jōyaku no mikata*, Gendaishi kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1965, p. 1; also, Lee Jongwon, op. cit., p. 28; Chang says that the talk was mediated by "General Matthew B. Ridgeway, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan, and his diplomatic adviser, Mr. William Sebald". See Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 63

<sup>123</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 18-19

San Francisco Treaty.<sup>124</sup> Their concern was to solve a number of problems, such as; (1) to stop Japanese fishing boats from trespassing into the Korean maritime zone denoted by the McArthur Line; (2) to acquire Japanese vessels left in the Republic of Korea following Japan's defeat; and, (3) to reach an agreement over the status of Koreans resident in Japan so that they could acquire a different status from other foreigners resident in Japan.<sup>125</sup> This latter issue was an especially urgent matter for the South Korean government. Although the same social services as provided to Japanese citizens were guaranteed to Koreans resident in Japan by the Japanese government for four years after the San Francisco Treaty came into effect, those Koreans would lose Japanese citizenship at the same time.<sup>126</sup>

On the other hand, the United States saw Japan-South Korean normalisation as necessary for strengthening ties among non-communist capitalist nations allied to it in Asia prior to the San Francisco Peace Treaty coming into effect.<sup>127</sup> Hatada et al argue that the establishment of close ties between Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan was aimed at countering the communist PRC regime, which had become a major concern for the United States.<sup>128</sup> Considering that the Japan-Taiwan normalisation negotiation was started at the same time<sup>129</sup> despite considerable domestic and political opposition to it in Japan, it is a convincing argument. In fact, the policy for post-Occupation Japan prepared by the United States National Security

<sup>124</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 4-19. The Republic of Korea succeeded in convincing the United States to alter Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which acknowledges South Korea as having received Japanese treasures left in Korea from SCAP-GHQ. It also attempted to enforce the 'Peace Line' before the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, but was not successful.

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*, p. 5

<sup>126</sup> Miyazaki Shigeki, 'Zainichi kankokujin no hōteki chi-i', in *Jurisuto*, vol. 327, August 1965, p. 25

<sup>127</sup> Gendaishi kenkyūsho hen, *op. cit.*, p. 1; also see Ishikawa Shigeru et al., *op. cit.*, p. 20

<sup>128</sup> Hatada Takashi et al, *op. cit.*, p. 63. Hatada goes further and argues that the rearmament of Japan and the establishment of the Japan-South Korea security alliance was attempted before the start of the Korean War.

<sup>129</sup> Imazu Hiroshi, "'15 Nen kōshō' saishū dankai e', in *Asahi Jānaru*, 10 October 1965, p. 15

Council in May 1951 states that one of Japan's projected roles would be the "development of appropriate military forces" and "participation in a regional security arrangement".<sup>130</sup> The basis of such an arrangement would obviously be fully normalised relations, including trade and military relations, between those United States aligned nations in the region.

The Japanese, although conforming to the United States request to open normalisation talks with the Republic of Korea, were rather passive during the negotiations, unwilling to settle any issue at the preliminary talks.<sup>131</sup> The only issue the Japanese showed interest in was the legal status of Koreans in Japan.<sup>132</sup> The Korean side "felt that Japan would be in a more advantageous position after the Peace Treaty became effective and Japanese sovereignty was restored"<sup>133</sup> and thus were anxious to resolve all issues as soon as possible. The Korean negotiators presumed that the Japanese passiveness was derived from their intention to prolong the negotiation until the effect of the McArthur Line (The boundary which temporarily determined the fishing zones of Japan and the Republic of Korea<sup>134</sup>) was lost when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect.<sup>135</sup> Despite this passive position of the Japanese negotiators, it was agreed to have negotiations on the following matters; "(1) the legal status of Koreans residing in Japan; (2) The ownership of vessels which were within the Korean

<sup>130</sup> Dower, John W., 'The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan in and out of the Pentagon Papers', in *The Pentagon Papers*, vol.V, eds Chomsky, Noam and Zinn, Howard, Beacon Press, Boston, 1972, p. 117

<sup>131</sup> Confidential Source #1; also see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 21. According to those sources, Japanese negotiators remained only as "listeners" throughout the talks. The North Korean side supports this point as well. See: Chōsen Daigakkō, *Kan-nichi kaidan no keika to honshitsu ni tsuite - sono keika to haikei ni kansuru kōsatsu*, Chōsen daigakkō, Tokyo, 1961, p. 12

<sup>132</sup> Lee Chong-Sik, op. cit., pp. 52-53; Also, Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 21

<sup>133</sup> Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 65. A Korean negotiator judged it similarly; see Kim Dong-Jo, 1993, p. 21; see also Lee Chong-Sik, op. cit., p. 53

<sup>134</sup> Defined by Ko; see, Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 60

<sup>135</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 39



waters when Japan surrendered in 1945; (3) Property rights and claims, which derives from the colonial past; (4) the fishery line between Japan and the Republic of Korea; and, (5) diplomatic relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea"<sup>136</sup> and to form committees to discuss each topic from the beginning of the First Round Talks.<sup>137</sup>

Discussions on the legal status of Koreans and their treatment in Japan showed progress, since it was in the interests of both Japan and South Korea to resolve the issue. Although they disagreed on the nationality of Koreans in Japan, due to the objections by *Zainichi tōitsu Minshu sensen* (a DPRK aligned group in Japan), the Japanese showed interest in agreeing with the South Korean proposal of defining the status of Koreans in Japan as South Koreans.<sup>138</sup> During the discussion of those matters, it became clear that Japan and the Republic of Korea stood at completely different positions. Japan wished to conclude the normalisation of relations before any individual property or reparations settlement, while the Republic of Korea insisted on solving those matters before normalisation.<sup>139</sup> The negotiation of those matters showed the severe conflict of interests between the two countries, resulting in the negotiations being stopped on December 22, 1951.<sup>140</sup>

The Japanese position, as commonly held by politicians and bureaucrats, was to await the outcome of the Korean War, but, in the meantime to attempt to resolve the problem of the legal status of

---

<sup>136</sup> According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea, *The Korean View of Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Asian Policy*, September 1957, p.7. Cited in Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 65

<sup>137</sup> Confidential Source #1; also, Morita Yoshio, op. cit., p. 270

<sup>138</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 26-27

<sup>139</sup> Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 64

<sup>140</sup> Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 60

Koreans in Japan. Despite the intention of the United States to make Japan fight in the Korean War, Japan did not want to participate in the war by normalising relations with the Republic of Korea, other than economically. Japan profited greatly because of this war, which helped make a rapid Japanese economic recovery possible. In fact, there was no need for Japan to normalise trading relations with the Republic of Korea, since trade relations between the two nations had already started in 1949 despite the lack of fully normalised diplomatic relations being established.

The reason behind Japan's interest in the legal status of Koreans resident in Japan was mainly economic.<sup>141</sup> Ogawa Seiryō argues that the Japanese government feared the political power of Koreans, and attempted to weaken it by deporting them or integrating them into Japanese society by allowing Koreans to attend Japanese schools.<sup>142</sup> During the negotiations, the Japanese insisted on treating Koreans in the same way as all other foreigners. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea insisted on special treatment because the historical origins of the Korean residents differentiated them from other foreigners. It was pointed out that Koreans were forcibly brought to Japan to work in the war industry, or they came to Japan after losing their land in Korea due to Japanese confiscation of those lands.<sup>143</sup> The Japanese East Asian policy on property claims, to not settle the issue of reparations or property payments during this period, was reflected in the passivity of the Japanese negotiators when discussing this matter with the Koreans.

---

<sup>141</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 25. Kim recalls that the Japanese paid ¥6.5 billion for social security benefits in 1950 for 60,000 Koreans in Japan, and was planning to deport them because of the expense.

<sup>142</sup> Ogawa Seiryō, 'Zainichi kankokujin no hōteki chi-i taigū kyōtei', in *Hōritsu jihō*, vol. 37, September 1965, pp. 31-34

<sup>143</sup> Miyazaki Shigeki, op. cit., p. 25

## 2.2. The First Round Talks

The first round of negotiation talks was agreed to before the end of the preliminary round<sup>144</sup>, therefore, it was a continuation of the previous talks.<sup>145</sup> However, the establishment of the 'Peace Line' defined the maritime zone by the Republic of Korea generated considerable tensions between Japan and the Republic of Korea, making the reopening of the negotiation difficult.

The Republic of Korea, prior to this round, declared the establishment of the 'Peace Line' on January 18, 1952. It was designed to replace the McArthur Line prior to the San Francisco Treaty coming into effect, and was named so by Syngman Rhee.<sup>146</sup> The Republic of Korea feared that fishing by Japanese ships within South Korean waters would cause serious problems for the Korean fishing industry. The Japanese reacted aggressively against this Korean initiative.<sup>147</sup> The Korean declaration was immediately criticised by the United States, which supported the Japanese, and was followed by criticism from Taiwan.<sup>148</sup> U.S. General Clark's intervention at this point resulted in an agreement between Syngman Rhee and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to re-open the normalisation negotiations.<sup>149</sup>

During this round, issues related to (1) basic relations between Japan and South Korea (2) the legal status and treatment of Koreans in Japan

<sup>144</sup> Hirobe Kazuya et al., 'Shiryō nikkān kaidan 14 nen no kiseki', in *Hōritsu jihō*, vol. 37, September 1965, p. 45 ; also Gendaishi Kenkyūsho, op. cit., p. 1, says that the agreement was reached to open the First Round Talks from February the following year.

<sup>145</sup> Kimura Shūzō, 'Nikkān kōshō no kei-i', in *Nikkān kankei no tenkai*, ed. Tanaka Naokichi, Yūhikaku, Tokyo, 1963, p. 115

<sup>146</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 39

<sup>147</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 42-43. The Japanese government and fishermen, who expected the McArthur Line to expire, were deeply resentful of the appearance of another line, and showed their anger by calling it the 'Rhee Line'.

<sup>148</sup> *ibid.*, p. 41

<sup>149</sup> Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 61. Also see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 46. Kim mentions both the agreement to reopen the meeting and the United States' 'guidance' to reopen the negotiations.



(3) the ownership of Japanese vessels remaining in Korea (4) property claims and (5) fisheries, were discussed in different committees as decided at the preliminary talks. The issue of the legal status of Koreans in Japan was intensively discussed, but the talk was dominated by the continuing conflict of interest on the fishery issue, represented by the problems of the 'Peace Line' and related property claims.<sup>150</sup> At these talks, possibly for the first time, the Japanese side claimed property rights against the Republic of Korea for Japanese property remaining in South Korea.<sup>151</sup> As previously noted, the Japanese priority at the time was to prolong the settlement of the property claims issue, thus delaying the accompanying expenditures for the payment.<sup>152</sup> This tactic was successful. There was also Japanese dissatisfaction towards the United States, which gave Japanese private property in Korea to South Koreans despite continued Japanese interest in it.<sup>153</sup> However, discussing this dissatisfaction was likely to delay the settlement against the will of the United States which wanted normalisation to occur as quickly as possible, as had already occurred with the Japan-Taiwan settlement.

The Koreans were outraged by the Japanese property demand, and requested the United States to clarify with the Japanese the interpretation of Article 4 of the San Francisco Treaty, which provided for the automatic acquisition of Japanese property remaining in Korea

---

<sup>150</sup> Kimura Shūzō, op. cit., p. 115

<sup>151</sup> Confidential Source#1 says that Japan did make a property claim against South Korea at the preliminary talks. Also, Kim Dong-jo, says that Japan first claimed Japanese property left in Korea at the fifth meeting from March 6, 1952, op. cit., p. 53

<sup>152</sup> Ōkurashō zaisei shitsu hen, *Shōwa zaisei shi - shūsen kara kōwa made Vol 1*, Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1984, p. 537 ; admits that prolonging the settlement benefited Japan in terms of economic recovery. Kim Dong-jo shares this view as well; op. cit., p. 56

<sup>153</sup> Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 3. Also, Confidential Source #5 said that this Japanese claim was justified by the Hague Convention in 1907 which could be interpreted as the United Nations having the right to acquire Japanese government property in Japan's former colonies, but not the private property of Japanese nationals in those countries. Obviously, this interpretation was open to challenge.

by the Republic of Korea.<sup>154</sup> For South Koreans, who abandoned reparation claims and compensation demands for Japanese colonialism in Korea, and limited its property claim to the minimum level in order to realise normalisation, it was a total surprise that the Japanese made such a "shameless"<sup>155</sup> claim. The United States responded to the South Korean plea for clarification of the meaning of the article by sending a memorandum to the South Korean ambassador to the United States on April 29, stating that Japan was unable to claim property left in the Republic of Korea according to Article 4(b), but that they could bargain the amount of payment to the Republic of Korea by abandoning the property claim lodged against it according to Article 4(a).<sup>156</sup>

This American interpretation was relayed to the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Takeuchi, on May 16, but was not officially provided to Japan until December 31, 1957.<sup>157</sup> This interpretation may have been based on American support for the Japanese view that the greatest obstacle to normalisation was the issue of property claims. The interpretation provided Japan with a means by which it could bargain down the property claim by the Republic of Korea,<sup>158</sup> reflecting the strongly held American view that Japan was the linchpin of its total East Asian strategy. This United States act was a miscalculation, if it was indeed aimed at rapidly concluding the normalisation treaty. It indicated a basic misunderstanding by the United States of the depth of feeling against the Japanese in Korea and the determination of the new South Korean state to be dealt with in international circles as an equal of Japan. Probably, some American officials thought the normalisation

---

154 *ibid.*, p. 55. This issue was resolved only after 1957.

155 Kim Dong-Jo, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55

156 Kimura Shūzō, *op. cit.*, p. 116; see also Hirobe Kazuya et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 45-55

157 *loc. cit.*

158 Ko Jun-Sok, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64

process between Japan and South Korea would be as easy as the Japan-Taiwan Normalisation Treaty, which only took a year to conclude, principally by Taiwan abandoning its right to a property claim against Japan.

Considering the characteristics of Japanese colonialism in Korea, it was very difficult for South Korea to abandon its property claim against Japan, which, among other political and economic factors, made the normalisation process different from that negotiated between Japan and Taiwan. Additionally, it was probable that there was also a legitimacy problem for Rhee whose popularity essentially rested on his anti-Japanese stance.

Japan kept forcing its property claim on the Republic of Korea, while Korea, in return, did not have any intention of letting Japan bargain for the claims they were making. As a result, the negotiation was recessed in April. Shortly thereafter, the capture of Japanese fishermen who crossed the "Peace Line" escalated the conflict. The United States dramatically shifted its previous position of supporting the Japanese on this issue when they were forced to stop the accelerating conflict between Japan and the Republic of Korea by establishing what became known as the 'Clark Line' on September 27. Although it almost duplicated the 'Peace Line', the official reason presented by the United States for establishing this line was to prevent the entry of communists and to bloc illegal exports from the Republic of Korea.<sup>159</sup> It was, however, really aimed at preventing Japanese fishing boats crossing the 'Peace Line'. Japan rejected the establishment of this line and Japanese fishing boats kept crossing it.<sup>160</sup>

---

<sup>159</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 43

<sup>160</sup> *ibid.*, p. 43



Despite continuous United States intervention, the Japanese negotiator's intention at this round was to avoid paying property claims, as in the preliminary talks, and to concentrate on solving the problem of the 'Peace Line' and of the legal status of Koreans in Japan. In order to counter the Korean demand for early settlement, the Japanese claimed Japanese property left in the Republic of Korea before the war ended, which they realised was not possible because of Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, as previously discussed. Kim Dong-Jo wrote in his memoir that one of the Japanese negotiators later said that they just made up this claim in order to delay the settlement<sup>161</sup>, but he does not specifically state the negotiator.

The Japanese continued to insist on solving each problem, such as the fisheries problem, and the issue of the legal status of Koreans, before the settlement of the property claims issue, while the Republic of Korea insisted on solving all the issues at once, as in previous talks. South Korean negotiators knew that they could use the 'Peace Line' issue as a bargaining tool in attempting to resolve other issues. The United States intervention during this round through its interpretation of Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Treaty did not have any impact in resolving the issue, since it was used by Japan to justify its claim.

As the United States did not wish Japan to pay large amounts of money to the Republic of Korea in response to its property claims, and prioritised Japan's economic recovery, the United States decision not to back the Republic of Korea on this issue is understandable. It did not, however, assist the normalisation process. The talk was terminated

---

<sup>161</sup> *ibid.*, p. 56

because of the continuing conflict between Japan and South Korea over the issue of property claims, since neither side would give in.<sup>162</sup>

### 2.3. Second Round Talks

The Second Round Talks were began on April 15, 1953 with American assistance. United States General Clark privately invited Syngman Rhee to a meeting and arranged for him to meet Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. They subsequently agreed to reopen the talks.<sup>163</sup> These talks were later postponed at Japan's request when the Japanese heard about the opening of the Geneva Conference on Korea in April 1954. The negotiation were then adjourned to July 23, 1954.

These negotiations were held in five different committees as in the First Round Talks. The committees focussed on: (1) basic relations between Japan and South Korea; (2) the legal status and treatment of Koreans in Japan; (3) the ownership of Japanese vessels remaining in South Korea; (4) the South Korean property claim; and (5) fisheries. During this three-month negotiation round, Japan maintained its previous position of avoiding reaching an agreement on property claims before resolution of the two issues of fishery rights and the legal status of Korean residents in Japan. The logic here was the same as previously: to wait upon the outcome of the Korean War and the abolition of the 'Clark Line' after the end of the Korean War. Since the 'Clark Line' was officially established in order to stop communists entering the Republic of Korea, it had to be abolished after the truce was signed between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK. The 'Clark Line' was eventually abolished on August 27, 1953, after the truce between South Korea and the DPRK was signed on July 27 the same

---

<sup>162</sup> Maeda Toshikazu, *op. cit.*, p. 3

<sup>163</sup> Ko Jun-Sok, *op. cit.*, p. 64; also see Chang Young-Gil, *op. cit.*, p. 69

year. Japanese negotiators thought they could negotiate on an equal basis with the Republic of Korea about the 'Peace Line' after American assurances that the 'Peace Line' had been abolished.

Japanese perspectives, reflected in this round of negotiation, were dominated by the economic development centred thinking of politicians and bureaucrats, which were shared between the two groups. Fishermen's interests did not yet have enough impact to shift the Japanese negotiating position to force a rapid settlement of the property claims issue. Also, the political and social activities of Koreans in Japan were also insignificant in terms of the improvement of their status being reflected in the negotiating position of the Japanese government, although the activities of *Zainichi tōitsu Minshu sensen* (a DPRK aligned group in Japan), made Japanese negotiators hesitate in agreeing that all Koreans in Japan would be classified as South Korean citizens. During this period, intellectuals and the media did not seem to have much interest in the issue either and were not influential.

Summing up the negotiations during the Korean War, it seems evident that the prime goal of Japanese and American East Asian policies during this period - the economic recovery of Japan - was reflected in the Japanese negotiating position throughout the three negotiation rounds. The United States wanted the normalisation of relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, but their first priority was Japanese economic recovery. This was reflected in the American initiative to assist the opening of the talks, and in its unwillingness to support the Republic of Korea in pressuring Japan to accept its conditions. Japanese perspectives during this period were dominated by political and bureaucratic orientations, with little, if any,



influence being exerted by intellectuals or community groups, or indeed, any groups outside government and the bureaucracy.

After the Korean War, the United States maintained its interest in normalisation and continued to exercise its influence over the issue. Although the United States maintained its support for Japanese economic development<sup>164</sup> and rearmament, changes in the Japanese government, from Yoshida to Hatoyama, Ishihara then Kishi, resulted in different policies being pursued by Japan on the normalisation issue. The Rhee regime in the Republic of Korea, on the other hand, continued with the same policy until it was overthrown by the student revolution in 1960.

### 3.1. Third Round Talks

The abolition of the 'Clark Line' following the signing of the truce between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK caused serious conflict between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Following the abolition, Japanese fishing boats flooded into the Korean side of the 'Peace Line'. South Korea responded to these incursions by capturing large numbers of Japanese fishing boats. Although the number of Japanese boats captured by the Republic of Korea was very high and the resultant domestic furor in Japan very heated, the United States was initially reluctant to intervene in the problem.<sup>165</sup>

This massive capture of Japanese fishing boats and fishermen by South Korea altered the Japanese negotiating position in that the fishery problem became one of the major issues. When the numbers of the boats captured by the Republic of Korea reached 70, the Japanese

<sup>164</sup> Cohen and Goldhamer, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

<sup>165</sup> Hilderbrand and Hilderbrand, op. cit., p. 72.

### 3: NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR TO 1960

After the Korean War, the United States maintained its interest in normalisation and continued to exercise its influence over the issue. Although the United States maintained its support for Japanese economic development<sup>164</sup> and rearmament, changes in the Japanese government, from Yoshida to Hatoyama, Ishibashi then Kishi, resulted in different policies being pursued by Japan on the normalisation issue. The Rhee regime in the Republic of Korea, on the other hand, continued with the same policies until it was overthrown by the student revolution in 1960.

#### 3.1. Third Round Talks

The abolition of the 'Clark Line' following the signing of the truce between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK caused serious conflict between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Following the abolition, Japanese fishing boats flooded into the Korean side of the 'Peace Line'. South Korea responded to these intrusions by capturing large numbers of Japanese fishing boats. Although the number of Japanese boats captured by the Republic of Korea was very high and the resultant domestic furore in Japan very heated, the United States was initially reluctant to intervene in the problem.<sup>165</sup>

This massive capture of Japanese fishing boats and fishermen by South Korea altered the Japanese negotiating position in that the fishery problem became one of the major issues. When the numbers of the boats captured by the Republic of Korea reached 70, the Japanese

---

<sup>164</sup> Chōsen daigakkō, op. cit., pp. 16-17

<sup>165</sup> Hatada Takashi et al., op. cit., p. 72

government was forced to initiate the opening of the next negotiation round. Within this context of a major international dispute and significant domestic political pressure, the Third Round Talks were thus resumed on October 6, 1953.

The initiative of the Japanese government in opening the Third Round Talks shows that the pressure on the government to resolve the fishery problem was serious. Therefore, the approach by the Japanese to these talks was precipitated by domestic political considerations and, for the first time, the talks were influenced by factors other than those associated with Korea's colonial past and Japanese imperialist aggression.

Accordingly, the prime interest of the Japanese negotiators at this meeting was the fishery problem. The Japanese demanded the return of Japanese fishing boats and fishermen, but the Korean negotiators maintained their position, accusing the Japanese of violating the 'Peace Line'.<sup>166</sup> After this, both sides agreed to hold negotiations in the five different committees as in the second round talk, those committees meeting on: (1) basic relations between Japan and South Korea; (2) the legal status and treatment of Koreans in Japan; (3) the ownership of Japanese vessels remaining in Korea; (4) the South Korean property claim; and (5) fisheries.

It was in the committee discussing the property claim during the Third Round Talks that the infamous 'Kubota comments' incident took place. These comments were made by the chief of the Japanese negotiation team, Kubota Kan'ichirō. The comments which infuriated the Korean negotiators were that "Thirty-six years of Japanese

---

<sup>166</sup> Kimura Shūzō, *op. cit.*, p. 117



colonisation of Korea was beneficial for Koreans" and that the description in the Cairo Declaration that "Japan enslaved Koreans, was an hysteric expression of Allied nations during the war."<sup>167</sup> The Korean negotiators were outraged by these comments, and demanded Kubota apologise. Kubota responded by saying that his comments were "not wrong". The negotiation was thus terminated.<sup>168</sup> Both Japan and the Republic of Korea blamed the other side for disrupting the talks.<sup>169</sup>

These comments made by the chief negotiator reflected typical Japanese attitudes towards Korea at the time. The break up of the negotiation was the result of two very different perspectives. The Japanese attitude was to justify the colonisation of Korea and to argue that Japan's rule was good for Korea by developing its infrastructure. However, the attitudes shared by the Korean government, including Syngman Rhee, were the opposite. The government of the Republic of Korea was firmly convinced that their nation was exploited and victimised by Japanese colonisation and approached the normalisation talks from this perspective.

### 3.2. Fourth Round Talks

The establishment of Hatoyama regime worsened the conflict between Japan and the Republic of Korea, bringing what was termed 'hostage

---

<sup>167</sup> According to the South Korean record of the negotiation talks; see Sasaki Ryūji, *op. cit.*, p. 123

<sup>168</sup> Maeda Toshikazu, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5. Maeda attended the meeting when this incident took place. He recalls that a top-level politician talked to Kubota at the end of the meeting and said that despite all the 'serious discussion' that day, he wished that both Japan and South Korea would overcome the obstacles and conclude the treaty. The Japanese side at this point was not expecting the Korean side to terminate the talks. Probably it was partly due to South Korean tactics to use the 'Kubota Comments' as a bargaining tool. This is clear from the later reaction of South Koreans to similar comments made by Sawada Renzō, Takasugi Shinichi and Shina Etsusaburō. The 'Kubota Comments' were the only statement criticised by the South Koreans.

<sup>169</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, *op. cit.*, pp. 85, 90. This comment was initially supported by the government.

diplomacy,<sup>170</sup> between the two countries. Japan detained Koreans who tried to enter Japan illegally, and the Republic of Korea continued to capture fishermen who crossed the 'Peace Line'. The Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu negotiated the reopening of talks by retracting the 'Kubota comments' and reached an agreement with the Republic of Korea about the mutual release of those detained, only to find that the agreement was rejected by Justice Ministry bureaucrats<sup>171</sup> who did not agree with the idea of compromising on the status of Koreans in Japan, despite the political need to reopen the negotiations. This action was indicative of the strength of central ministry bureaucrats at this time, particularly with regard to these negotiations, and of their disregard for political solutions.

One of the reasons why bilateral relations worsened during the Hatoyama government was the close ties it established with various communist regimes. Hatoyama announced a new foreign policy which he titled 'autonomous people's diplomacy'<sup>172</sup> aimed at establishing a more autonomous, less American aligned diplomacy. He began to improve relations with the DPRK, the People's Republic of China and the USSR, initiatives which would obviously displease South Korea.

Although the South Korean Vice Foreign Minister was informed by the Japanese government on June 17 that Japan did not intend to resume relations with the DPRK, Japanese news reporters, academics and businessmen were allowed to visit Pyongyang after this.<sup>173</sup> Japan-China trade during the Hatoyama government dramatically increased

---

170 *ibid.*, p. 108-113

171 Chang Young-Gil, *op. cit.*, p. 86

172 *ibid.*, p. 76

173 *ibid.*, p. 80; also see Kim Dong-Jo, *ibid.*, p. 109. This was in response to the proposal by Kim Il Sung, then premier of the DPRK, to normalise relations with Japan on February 25th, 1955.

by 50% from 1954 to 1955.<sup>174</sup> Negotiation of a Peace Treaty with the USSR was started in 1955. In October 1956, Japan succeeded in signing a fisheries agreement with the USSR, followed by a similar treaty with the PRC.<sup>175</sup>

It was difficult for Japan to ask for American assistance to pressure South Korea to open the Fourth Round Talks because the United States had just succeeded in convincing a reluctant Syngman Rhee to resume a truce with the DPRK.<sup>176</sup> The United States therefore pressured Japan to apologise for the 'Kubota comments' while, at the same time, pressuring Syngman Rhee to reopen the negotiations. While this was accomplished, the positions of both nations was unchanged.<sup>177</sup> American Secretary of the State Dulles attempted to bring about the mutual release of those who were detained. The agreement on the mutual release was reached due to this American effort, and even though it was not implemented due to the opposition of bureaucrats as mentioned, it does nevertheless demonstrated the continuing degree of influence of the United States over Japan and South Korea.

The interactions of Japan with communist countries drove the South Korean government to suspend trade with Japan in August 1955. After this, Walter Robertson, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, consulted with Rhee and Hatoyama, in order to promote the reopening of the negotiations. However, this attempt failed as it was rejected by a Japanese Cabinet decision in December 1956.<sup>178</sup> The aggressive stance by the Republic of Korea derived from

---

<sup>174</sup> Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 77

<sup>175</sup> *ibid.*, p. 90

<sup>176</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 89

<sup>177</sup> *ibid.*, p. 89

<sup>178</sup> Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 93



renewed American commitment to supporting it economically and militarily after the Korean War. Thus, in the absence of overt pressure from the United States, Korea could afford to indulge its continuing anti-Japanese sentiment in the negotiation process. The need for South Korea to secure payment from the Japanese for property claims was rendered less urgent by increased American aid. Also, Japanese attempts to resume relations with the PRC, USSR and DPRK during the period of the Hatoyama government were unacceptable to the Rhee regime, which was therefore willing to stall negotiations until this policy changed.

The resumption of the talks seemed possible when Ishibashi Tanzan took over from Hatoyama as Prime Minister. He showed his intention to normalise relations with the Republic of Korea by "abandoning everything we could"<sup>179</sup> in respect of Japanese claims, giving hope to the Korean side. However, he retired after only two months because of illness. It was therefore through the initiative of Kishi Nobusuke, who became Prime Minister on February 25, 1957, that the negotiations were reopened.

Kishi showed an obvious interest in an early rapprochement between the two nations.<sup>180</sup> On February 25, 1957, Kishi personally met Kim Dong-Jo, who was responsible for the negotiations at the time, and told him of his determination to normalise relations between Japan and South Korea, asking that a message to this effect be delivered to Rhee.<sup>181</sup> Kishi also wanted a resolution of the fishery problem, mentioning the detention of fishermen from his electorate in

---

179 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 114

180 *ibid.*, p. 117

181 *ibid.*, pp. 114-117; also see Yamamoto Tsuyoshi, 'Kan-nichi kankei to Yatsugi Kazuo', in *Kokusai seiji*, vol. 75, October 1983, pp. 43-56

Yamaguchi Prefecture.<sup>182</sup> Considering the number of fishing boats captured was 152 and the number of fishermen detained amounted to 2025 in 1957, the political pressure placed on Kishi is obvious.<sup>183</sup> The reason behind his interest in the negotiation could also be that he was receiving secret cash contributions from the American Central Intelligence Agency through his brother Satō Eisaku, then the Finance Minister.<sup>184</sup>

During the negotiations to reopen the formal talks, Japan maintained its position of pursuing the right to claim Japanese property left in Korea. The United States, upon the request of Japan and the Republic of Korea, repeated the interpretation of Article 4 of the San Francisco Treaty which it had previously provided to South Korean and Japanese government.<sup>185</sup> This enabled Japan to demand property rights of Korea in case the amount of property compensation the Republic of Korea demanded from Japan was too large.<sup>186</sup> The Japanese tactic was to abandon the right to claim property once the negotiations were re-opened, but leave the possibility in the agreement so that they could bring up the issue in case the Korean property claim was enormous. Also, the Japanese Foreign Ministry delayed the mutual

---

<sup>182</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 116

<sup>183</sup> Morita Yoshio, op. cit., pp. 271-272. A resolution was made with support from both the ruling and opposition parties, to solve the problem of those detained fishing boats and fishermen. The resolution was made twice in 1952, five times in 1953, five times in 1955 and once in 1956. The lack of action indicates the inability of the political system at this stage to cope with such difficult issues, no matter what the influences acting upon it were; also Confidential Source #2 confirmed that the fishery problem was probably one of the most serious issues around this period.

<sup>184</sup> *New York Times*, October 9, 1994, p. 1. 'C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's'.

<sup>185</sup> Confidential Source #5 said that Japan requested the American interpretation; For the South Korean view, see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 128

<sup>186</sup> Confidential Source #5. From the Japanese point of view, this American interpretation became the basis of the Japanese position to bargain over what the Japanese bureaucrats thought would be an exceptionally large property claim by South Korea. It formed the basis of an intended Japanese counter-claim. He also said that Japanese private property left in Korea was valued at more than the South Korean property claim against the Japanese. This perhaps indicates the pragmatic harshness with which the Japanese bureaucrats were willing to defend what they perceived to be the Japanese national interest in the negotiations. For the South Korean view see Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 128-130

release of those detained by Japan and South Korea by announcing the sending to the DPRK of 53 of the Koreans detained, who wished to go there.<sup>187</sup> Kim Dong-Jo observed that some of the officials in the Foreign Ministry were connected to a faction within the LDP opposed to the Kishi faction, which therefore made the negotiations difficult. Additionally, these bureaucrats could also have been acting from profit-centred bureaucratic motives.<sup>188</sup> Foreign Minister Fujiyama, seemingly factionally opposed to Kishi, also avoided reopening the normalisation talks, opposing some LDP members who were "acting on the advice of Prime Minister Kishi", and were attempting to intervene politically in the negotiations to reopen the talks.<sup>189</sup>

Kishi, in order to reopen the negotiations, sent a personal envoy Yatsugi Kazuo, to Rhee on May 19, 1958.<sup>190</sup> Thus, the Fourth Round Talks were opened on April 15, by formal Japanese withdrawal of the 'Kubota comments' and of the property claim against Korea. It was agreed to discuss the issues of; (1) basic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea; (2) the legal status and treatment of Koreans residing in Japan; (3) the Republic of Korea property claim against Japan; and (4) fisheries and the 'Peace Line'. Despite the positive attitude of Kishi, the negotiation did not progress, since both sides were in conflict on all the issues.<sup>191</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, *ibid.*, p. 139

<sup>188</sup> Confidential Source #4 said that he was not going to sacrifice the Japanese national interest for a quick solution to the fishery problems. This illustrates again that political interests differed from bureaucratic interests, with bureaucrats quite willing to take a hard, narrow, long term view almost regardless of the short term consequences. He also said that his priority at the time was the North Pacific Fishery Treaty negotiations with the United States, not the South Korean negotiations. It seems probable that it was not a priority for the bureaucrats to negotiate with South Korea at the time.

<sup>189</sup> Chang Young-Gil, *op. cit.*, p. 110. A good-will visit to South Korea by Fujiyama was planned by those LDP members who were aligned with Kishi, but Fujiyama refused to visit South Korea.

<sup>190</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-148

<sup>191</sup> *ibid.*, p. 149; Confidential Source #2 said that the Japanese were willing to solve the problems, but the South Koreans did not show any interest until the autumn of that year, 1958. Probably they were both interested in solving the issue, but to their own advantage; both parties were unwilling to give in to the other.



This negotiation was almost jeopardised because of a Japanese plan to send Koreans wishing to be so repatriated to the DPRK. According to Kim Dong-Jo, this Japanese plan was initiated by the *Zainihon chōsenjin sōrengōkai* - usually abbreviated to *Chōsōren* (a DPRK aligned organisation which was formed from *Zainichi tōitsu minshu sensen* in 1955).<sup>192</sup> *Zai nihon daikan minkoku kyoryū mindan* - usually abbreviated to Mindan (a South Korean aligned organisation established in 1946) countered this attempt, but failed due to poor funding and organisation compared to *Chōsōren*.<sup>193</sup> Kim Dong-Jo argues that the Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama Ai-ichirō, pushed this issue for economic advantage, while Prime Minister Kishi attempted to stop the plan, until its success became apparent.<sup>194</sup> Fujiyama, the head of *Nihon shōkō kaigisho* (Japan Chamber of Commerce), was economically centred, while Kishi was politically centred in approach. This conflict between the Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister, who were factionally opposed within the LDP, illustrates the weakness of the Japanese political system, particularly the LDP of the time, in resolving contentious issues in a disciplined way. It can also be hypothesised that the Foreign Minister was assisted in his policy by the bureaucrats in his own and other ministries who may have had views opposed to those of the Prime Minister.

<sup>192</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 122, 153-159. *Chōsōren* first sent 20 Koreans to the DPRK, with the assistance of the International Red Cross. The Red Cross approved of this because *Chōsōren* told them that 600,000 Koreans wished to go back to the DPRK, but were unable to do so because of South Korean obstruction. *Chōsōren* also advocated the unification of Korea, better treatment of Koreans in Japan, the promotion of racial education of Koreans in Japan, and the normalisation of relations between North Korea and Japan.

<sup>193</sup> Mitchell, Richard H. *The Korean Minority in Japan*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967, p. 125; "During the late 1950's some members of Mindan exerted pressure on South Korea to speed up negotiations with the Japanese and to come to an agreement, in order to improve the position of the Koreans in Japan." Their attempt was not so significant because they were not influential enough to stop the Japanese government from sending Koreans to the DPRK. This also implies that *Chōsōren* had a significant impact on the Japanese government, despite its official stance towards the DPRK. The source of this influence is not known, although it could well have been through an association with the Socialist Party and/or with particular members of that party.

<sup>194</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-227

The Japanese Welfare Ministry attempted to reduce social security payments to Korean residents, of which "the number of recipients was ten times higher for Koreans than for Japanese."<sup>195</sup> It is possible that there was pressure from the Finance Ministry, as well as the Welfare Ministry for Fujiyama to send Koreans to the DPRK, thereby, saving ¥2,600 million which was paid annually to Koreans from 1952 to 1956.<sup>196</sup> South Korean attention became focused on stopping this, while Japanese negotiators maintained the position that this issue was irrelevant to the normalisation negotiation.<sup>197</sup> This clearly illustrates the view that Korea saw the treatment of Koreans in Japan as an international issue, while Japan tried to classify it as a domestic issue.

Japan requested the United States to influence the Republic of Korea to reopen the negotiations until the attempted repatriation of Koreans to the DPRK seemed successful.<sup>198</sup> Despite the Republic of Korea's request to stop this attempt, the United States was unable to actively oppose this issue, since 'freedom to choose where you live' was acknowledged by International Convention.<sup>199</sup> When it became apparent that this plan was acknowledged by the International Red Cross, the United States Department of State made an announcement to support this plan.<sup>200</sup> Demonstrating support for the Japanese regime was probably the most crucial aim for the United States, once they realised that they could not stop the Japanese from this. The Republic of Korea continued its attempt to stop the sending of Koreans to the DPRK, but lost interest after the first ship with 975 of over eighty thousand

---

195 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 130

196 ibid., p. 130

197 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 161

198 ibid., p. 210; also Confidential Source #2 said that this issue was 'irrelevant' for the normalisation talks, therefore the Japanese maintained a willingness to re-open the talks.

199 ibid., p. 207

200 Hirobe Kazuya et al., op. cit., pp. 45-55

Koreans left Japan on December 14, 1959.<sup>201</sup> Japan-Korea trade was re-opened and the normalisation talks were resumed due to American pressure and the economic difficulties Korea was experiencing at the time.<sup>202</sup> However, the talks were stopped after only a day as Syngman Rhee was overthrown by the student revolution.

Examining the influence of American intervention and the Korean position after the Korean War to 1960, the regime change in Japan had a significant influence. Increasing demands by the United States for Japan to rearm and strengthen its ties with American aligned nations in Asia conflicted with Japanese economic interests during the Hatoyama regime. Hatoyama's 'autonomous people's policy' reflected Japanese business needs to re-establish economic relations with countries other than the United States, therefore were against American will to keep Japan within the bloc of American-aligned nations. The Japanese government also faced a legitimacy problem because of pressure by the fishing industry to resolve the dispute over fishing rights with South Korea. The Japanese side initiated the opening of both the Third and Fourth Round Talks, largely due to the capture of Japanese fishermen and fishing boats by the Republic of Korea, and political pressure on the government. American pressure also contributed to the opening of the fourth round negotiations in terms of making the Japanese side give up its property claim against Japanese property left in Korea. This was assisted through Kishi's personal intervention, who was receiving cash contributions from the CIA.<sup>203</sup>

---

<sup>201</sup> The South Korean Embassy in Japan even attempted to bomb the Japan Red Cross at the beginning of December in order to stop the return of Koreans to the DPRK; see Mazaki Mitsuharu, *Kokusai mondai shirizu 27 nikkun kōshō - sono keika to mondai ten*, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1962, p. 20

<sup>202</sup> Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 116

<sup>203</sup> *New York Times*, op. cit., p.1



Despite the United States political interests in the negotiations, and some Japanese politicians' support for the normalisation, Japanese bureaucrats remained opposed to accepting the Korean conditions.<sup>204</sup> The Welfare Ministry, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance, as well as the Foreign Ministry were determined to send Koreans to the DPRK, even though it would have jeopardised the normalisation negotiations with South Korea. The attitudes of some of the Japanese negotiators towards colonialism in Korea was also the basis for severe conflict with the Korean negotiators, terminating the Third Round Talks. Whether this was done purposely can only be guessed at. The impact of *Chōsōren* activity, which influenced the Japanese government to send Koreans to the DPRK, was significant in a way that it succeeded in making the Japanese government agree with the interests of a well organised community group.<sup>205</sup> In this stage of the negotiations, two community groups had emerged to influence the government; the fisheries organisations and *Chōsōren*.

---

<sup>204</sup> Confidential Source #2 says Japan was estimating the amount of the South Korean property claim as being around \$US800 million, which was based on the amount of reparations paid to the Philippines. He stated that Japan could not possibly accept the South Korean demand of \$US8,000 million for reparations.

<sup>205</sup> Confidential Source #2 insisted that this issue was totally 'irrelevant' to the Japanese negotiating position. He also said that he was reporting directly to the Prime Minister at the time. It is possible to hypothesise that both the negotiators and Prime Minister Kishi were promoting the negotiations, while some bureaucrats and the Foreign Minister, as well as some LDP members were against it.

#### 4: Negotiations From 1960 To The Conclusion Of The Treaty

The negotiations from 1960 reflected major changes in the South Korean stance due to the overthrow of the Rhee government, as well as changes in the nature of American containment and hegemonic projects. These change were reflected in the Japanese policy changes initiated by Prime Minister Ikeda, who took over from Kishi in 1960.

##### 4.1. Fifth Round Talks

Economic strains on the United States brought on by the expense of its containment and hegemonic projects surfaced as the replacement of direct aid by loan to American aligned nations in Asia. This was initially done through the Development Loan Fund in 1957, and subsequently was endorsed in 1961 by the passing of the Overseas Assistance Act.<sup>206</sup> American military support for South Korea also decreased.<sup>207</sup> The revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1960 enabled the United States to shift a part of its financial burden for its military bases to Japan by allowing more autonomy to Japan in its security and foreign policies.

Prime Minister Ikeda, who took over from Kishi, presented broad economic policy goals as the basis of the rapid re-building of the Japanese nation. His priorities were; (1) to double GDP; (2) to normalise relations with South Korea; (3) to separate politics from economic issues.<sup>208</sup>

---

<sup>206</sup> Kasai Nobusachi, op. cit., p. 328

<sup>207</sup> Ha Young-Sun, 'America-Korean Military Relations: Continuity and Change', in *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, p. 118. "The South Koreans also had to face the MAP Transfer Program and a decrease in security-supporting assistance for defence budget support."

<sup>208</sup> Abe Hirozumi et al., 'Nikkan jōyaku', in *Nihon gaikōshi II*, ed. Abe Hirozumi et al., Mainichi shinbun sha, Tokyo, 1974, p. 559

When President Rhee was overthrown by the student revolution, the United States supported the newly established Chang Myŏn government, which assured the Japanese that it would re-start negotiations on the normalisation issue. South Korea, therefore, showed a clear interest in finalising arrangements for normalisation with Japan. The post-Rhee interim government announced that normalisation with Japan was "the top priority issue."<sup>209</sup> Chang Myŏn, who became Prime Minister on August 23, 1960 continued this stance.<sup>210</sup> This was a significant change from the Rhee government which had been dominated in its negotiating stance by Rhee's virulent anti-Japanese views.<sup>211</sup>

Judging the intention of the Chang Myŏn government to normalise relations with Japan as genuine,<sup>212</sup> the Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka visited South Korea. This was the first such visit by a Japanese Foreign Minister to South Korea, and resulted in the two nations agreeing to the re-opening of the normalisation negotiations in October 1960.<sup>213</sup> This visit was even more significant, in that, it marked the first major initiative on the talks taken by politicians rather than by Japanese bureaucrats.

The preparatory talks for re-opening the official Fifth Round Talks, were opened on October 25, 1960, with South Korea compromising by agreeing not to interfere with the Japanese discussions on the issue of

---

<sup>209</sup> Mazaki Mitsuharu, op. cit., p. 22

<sup>210</sup> Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 117. His major policies were reconstruction of the South Korean economy and normalization with Japan.

<sup>211</sup> Confidential Source #4 said that probably the normalisation treaty would not have been concluded during the Rhee regime; also Kim Dong-Jo quotes Rhee's comment that the normalisation with Japan should not be concluded until at least South Koreans above 40 years old pass away. See Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 123-124

<sup>212</sup> Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 5. In August 1960, the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that the negotiations be re-opened in Seoul.

<sup>213</sup> Morita Yoshio, 1991, p. 273



the repatriation of Koreans resident in Japan to the DPRK.<sup>214</sup> During the meeting it was agreed to discuss issues in four committees meeting simultaneously as in the Fourth Round Talks. These committees were to discuss, respectively; (1) diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea; (2) property claims by South Korea against Japan; (3) fishery issues and the 'Peace Line'; and (4) the legal status of Koreans in Japan.<sup>215</sup>

Despite the initial expectations of the Japanese that they could reach an agreement, continued widespread unrest in South Korea implied no guarantee of the survival of the Chang Myŏn regime. They therefore became passive towards the end of the negotiation<sup>216</sup> until South Korea showed their intention to abandon the 'Peace Line'. This concession occurred after the meeting of Iseki Yūjirō, Japanese Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau Chief and Kim Yŏn-shik, Vice Minister of the South Korean Foreign Ministry. Since the fishery issue was one of the major obstacles in the negotiations, it was a significant change for the better. However, the preparatory talks were stopped by the South Korean coup d'état on May 16 the following year, thus justifying the Japanese concerns about the stability of the Chang Myŏn government.<sup>217</sup> Therefore, the formal talks were not re-opened.

The Japanese negotiating position from 1960 reflected political and economic interests in promoting normalisation, which was supported by the pro-Japanese stance of Chang Myŏn government. Pro-South

---

214 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., pp. 236-237

215 Kimura Shuzo, 1963, p. 121

216 Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 6. Maeda, one of the principal negotiators involved in all the negotiation rounds, recalls that Chang Myŏn's leadership was weak, resulting in divisive struggles within the South Korean ruling party. This made the negotiations difficult for the Japanese as they had little confidence in any agreements being adhered to by South Korea if the Chang Myŏn government was to be overthrown.

217 Confidential Source #2 said that the normalisation treaty might have been settled earlier if this regime had continued.

Korea politicians such as Kishi Nobusuke and Satō Eisaku formed 'Nikkan mondai konshin kai' (The Discussion Committee on Japanese-Korean Relations) within the Liberal Democratic Party on April 1961, and eight members visited South Korea in May of that year.<sup>218</sup> This group also included Tanaka Kakuei, who was beginning to forge his political career through strong links to the business community. Japanese businessmen flooded into South Korea after a visa was given to a representative of Mitsubishi on August 17, 1960, reflecting the strong residual interest in South Korea on the part of the business community, which, it must be remembered, had treated Korea as part of the Japanese economy for most of the past fifty years.<sup>219</sup>

However, Ikeda had to be cautious on the normalisation issue since his predecessor Kishi was forced to resign on July 19, 1960, because of overwhelming objections against the conclusion of the Japan-United States Mutual Security Treaty.<sup>220</sup> During the *Anpo tōsō* (The movements against the ratification of Japan-United States Security Treaty), students broke into the Diet and confronted police, which resulted in one student's death. Over 300,000 people demonstrated a day before the ratification of the treaty, gathering around the Diet building, but it was secretly ratified nonetheless. Kishi, fearing the reaction of the people, decided to resign.<sup>221</sup> Ikeda, who took over Kishi after this massive popular movement, were afraid of the revival of this movement if he promoted Japan-South Korean normalisation immediately. Also, *Chōsōren*'s activity against the normalisation

---

218 Abe Hirozumi, 1974, p. 559. Pro-South Korea politicians such as Kishi Nobusuke and Satō Eisaku formed 'Nikkan mondai konshin kai' (The Discussion Committee on Japanese-Korean Relations) on April 1961, and 8 members visited South Korea in May; see also Chang Young-Gil, op. cit., p. 117

219 Lee Chong-Sik, op. cit., p. 67

220 ibid., p. 68

221 Abe Hirozumi et al. (b), 'Anpo Taisei', in *Nihon gaikō shi II*, ed. Abe Hirozumi et al., Mainichi shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1974, p. 558

might have had some impact on Ikeda's position. *Chōsōren* discussed the 'ways of unifying Korea' with *Mindan* in January 1961, claiming that the normalisation would be an obstacle to the unification of Korea.<sup>222</sup> This position was reinforced by the socialist and communist members of the Diet, with which *Chōsōren* had close relations.<sup>223</sup> Both Socialist and Communist Parties announced support for *Chōsōren* on April 19, 1961, where more than 6000 Japanese rallied to this cause.<sup>224</sup>

The instability of the South Korea regime, of course, became another reason for Japan to be cautious in continuing the negotiations. During this period, the interest of the business community and the pro-South Korean group, lead by Kishi, did not have enough impact on the Japanese negotiating position to progress the talks.

#### 4.2. Sixth Round Talks

The coup d'état of May 1961 in South Korea again brought changes to the South Korean stance on normalisation. Park Chung Hee, who came to power through the coup d'état, announced the goal of achieving normalisation with Japan as a priority.<sup>225</sup> Park announced a plan to return the government to civilian control by the end of 1963 and justified the military junta by stressing the necessity of reforming the country.<sup>226</sup> South Korean officials told Japanese Foreign Ministry officials that South Korea wanted to receive Japanese assistance for economic recovery and wished to normalise relations with Japan.<sup>227</sup>

---

<sup>222</sup> Mitchel, 1967, p. 148

<sup>223</sup> loc. cit.

<sup>224</sup> ibid., p. 149

<sup>225</sup> Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 6. He visited South Korea after the coup d'état to observe and report to the Foreign Ministry on the situation in the country and the intentions of the Park regime.

<sup>226</sup> loc. cit.

<sup>227</sup> loc. cit. Maeda, after the trip to South Korea, reported to the Foreign Ministry that the Park Regime was 'full of enthusiasm' about resolving the normalisation issue.



This demonstrated a radical departure on the part of South Korea and underlined the pragmatic stance of the Park regime - a position opposite to that of the Rhee government. Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda and Foreign Minister Kosaka convinced President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk to support the Park regime, resulting in Kennedy's statement on July 28, 1961 supporting it.<sup>228</sup> After intervention by Edwin Reischauer, the American ambassador to Japan, and Samuel Burger, his counterpart in South Korea<sup>229</sup>, the negotiations were reopened in October 1961.

American intervention continued during this period. Dean Rusk met Ikeda the following month, emphasising the strategic importance of South Korea and particularly Japan's role in stabilising the political situation and the economy of South Korea.<sup>230</sup> As the situation in Vietnam worsened following the assassination of President Diem on November 1, 1963, United States' pressure for Japan to normalise relations with South Korea increased further. In January 1964, United States Secretary of State Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy visited South Korea and announced American support for the normalisation of South Korea and Japan relations.<sup>231</sup> Rusk again made a statement on January 28, 1964 that "early rapprochement of the South Korea-Japan negotiation is beneficial for the entire liberal world."<sup>232</sup>

The Sixth Round Talks were opened from October 20, 1961. The significance of this meeting was that both sides recognised the limits of

228 Chong Sik-Lee, 1989, pp. 72-73

229 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 249

230 Abe Hirozumi et al., op. cit., p. 561

231 Okonogi Masao, op. cit., p. 137

232 Ko Jun-Sok, op. cit., p. 99

diplomatic negotiations, and agreed to hold political negotiations at the same time.<sup>233</sup> As a result, Park Chung Hee visited Japan on November 11, and held a meeting with Prime Minister Ikeda. At the meeting, Park implied that South Korea would not claim property as reparations, and that it would re-consider the issue of the 'Peace Line' if Japan showed sincerity on the issue of its property claim.<sup>234</sup> As a result, a meeting of foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea was held in March 1962.

This meeting was not very productive, since the Japanese government's position on one particular territorial issue, that *Take shima* (Take Island) was claimed as Japanese territory, was reported in the newspaper the day of the meeting.<sup>235</sup> The issue of this island was one of the issues under negotiation, with South Korea insisting that the island belonged to it, calling it *Tok-Do* (Tok-Island). It is not known if this report in the Japanese press was intentional or not, or what its purpose was. It may have been co-incidental, or it may have been a leak from a Ministry opposed to the position being taken on the talks by the Japanese government. Given the traditionally intimate relationships between ministries and their press clubs, the latter interpretation is not improbable and would indicate continuing conflict between bureaucrats and politicians on the best course for the negotiations.

After the re-election of the Ikeda government in July 1962, it became actively concerned with the normalisation issue, rating it as one of its policy priorities. Around late spring or the beginning of summer in 1962, the Japanese Foreign Minister met with the bureaucrats involved

---

233 Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 256

234 ibid., p. 263; Maeda also said that the property claim issue became the centre of the discussion; see Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 7

235 ibid., p. 7

in the negotiation process - Foreign Ministry, Justice Ministry and Finance Ministry officials- to consider the negotiating position in relation to the property claim against Japan. This meeting indicated the growing control of the negotiations by politicians and may have been indicative of the realisation by the government that the impasse which the bureaucrats had maintained for many years was becoming unproductive and may actually do Japan more harm economically and politically if it was to continue for much longer.

The meeting concluded that: (1) the settlement of property claims could be made difficult if South Korea had to provide evidence for the claims, since that evidence would be old. Furthermore, they might not be able to get all the evidence needed to substantiate the claim against Japan; (2) in order to solve this problem, it would be necessary for Japan to provide economic assistance through grants and loans instead of direct payments for the property claimed by South Korea, thus reducing the direct cost; and (3) it would also be necessary for the South Korean government to recognise that it did not have any right to pursue further property claims against Japan after receiving the economic assistance, because assistance provided would be made as payment for all Korean property claims against Japan.<sup>236</sup>

Following these decisions, Japan at last had a definite negotiating position from which a property settlement could be reached. Subsequently, at a meeting between Japanese Foreign Minister Ōhira and Korean Central Intelligence Agency chief Kim Jong-pil on November 12, 1962, both sides agreed on the amount of the property claim.<sup>237</sup> This amounted to payment by Japan to South Korea of a

---

<sup>236</sup>      *ibid.*, p. 8

<sup>237</sup>      Confidential Source #5 said that the Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry made an estimate of the maximum Japan could accept as a South Korean claim prior to the meeting; Confidential Source #2 implied that the amount of the property claim was negotiated prior to



\$US300 million direct grant plus \$US200 million aid, plus \$US100 million of low interest, long term, officially approved investment loans from private sources.<sup>238</sup> The agreement was incorporated in what became known as the 'Kin-Ōhira Memo' (Kim-Ōhira Memorandum), and was a landmark of the normalisation negotiations, since it resolved the biggest obstacle to normalisation; the issue of the South Korean property claim.<sup>239</sup> It was also agreed at the meeting that the payment would be deemed to be 'economic cooperation' by Japan, but was to be interpreted as 'a property claim' by South Korea.<sup>240</sup> The Japanese aim here was to stop the South Korean government from asking for further reparations or property claims against Japan after this settlement.<sup>241</sup> On December 15, South Korean negotiators presented the numbers of Koreans who died or were injured through forced labour by the Japanese Imperial government. They estimated 77,684 dead and 25,000 injured, claiming \$US364

---

this meeting, where Japan was willing to pay up to the same amount as it had paid to the Philippines; i.e. \$US800 million, whereas South Korea claimed \$US8 billion; Kim Dong-Jo said that the amount of the property claim was first discussed after the Park regime was established; see Kim Dong-Jo, *op. cit.*, p. 266

<sup>238</sup> Sasaki Ryūji, *op. cit.*, p. 133-134; see also Takasaki Sōji, 'Nikkan jōyaku de hoshō wa kaiketsu shitaka', in *Sekai*, vol. 572, September 1992, pp. 40-47; also *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 22, 1991, p. 5

<sup>239</sup> Confidential Source #5 strongly emphasised that the amount of the South Korean property claim was the biggest problem to be solved. He also said that the settlement of other issues followed this settlement and were therefore dependent on it, at least from the Japanese perspective.

<sup>240</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, *op. cit.*, p. 274. He also quoted the then Minister of International Trade and Industry, Satō Eisaku, as saying that Japan could not pay the property claim to South Korea as reparations, because it then "acknowledges Japanese illegally invaded and forcibly occupied Korea". Also Confidential Source #5 said that it was a 'gift' from Japan to South Korea for economic development, thus confirming that, the interpretation of the implications of formally paying reparations was shared by senior politicians and bureaucrats. When it is considered that Satō was in one of the groups pushing for an early conclusion of the treaty, and was relatively pro-Korean, one gets some idea of the depth of resistance of those who were actively opposed to it.

<sup>241</sup> Tanaka Hiroshi, *op. cit.*, p. 202. A Foreign Ministry official made a statement on this issue at the Diet in August 1991, commenting that the normalisation treaty of 1965 did not overturn the right of South Korean citizens to make property claims against Japan, as only claims by the South Korean state were included in the treaty and limited by its terms. Also see Takasaki Sōji, *op. cit.*, p. 40-47. Takasaki points out that the money paid to South Korea was mostly used for economic development. Of this, only 5.4% was allocated to those South Koreans who lost their property left in Japan. He argues that since the money was paid by Japan as 'economic cooperation', South Koreans should be able to make individual claims against the Japanese government.

million for reparations, only to find this refused by the Japanese.<sup>242</sup> Following this, Park Chung Hee approved the agreement achieved at the Ōhira-Kim meeting through an announcement on December 27, 1962.<sup>243</sup> Park probably chose to normalise relations with Japan at this stage and receive 'economic cooperation', rather than prolonging the negotiations and continuing to demand payment of the Korean estimates of reparations or property claims related to the numbers of dead and injured Koreans. The latter course would not guarantee payment of the South Korean demands and more negotiations would hamper economic development at a time when the nation required substantial funds for Park's industrialisation policies.<sup>244</sup>

In 1963, a plan to abandon the 'Peace Line' and to establish alternative measures to utilise national marine resources in South Korea, was proposed by Japan. This proposal was influenced by the new movement in international law to establish 12 mile national maritime zones to define territorial waters<sup>245</sup> and by a meeting between the Japanese and South Korean Agriculture and Fisheries ministers, another political level initiative. The Japanese proposal was: (1) to set a 12-mile territorial sea limit for fishing in both Japan and South Korea; (2) to establish common fishery territorial zones between Japan and South Korea which both nations could use; and (3) to provide Japanese assistance to South Korea to develop its fishing industry.<sup>246</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, the chief South Korean negotiator then, met Satō Eisaku,

---

<sup>242</sup> Takasaki Sōji, op. cit., p. 45-46

<sup>243</sup> Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 8

<sup>244</sup> Confidential Source #6 was sent to South Korea as an envoy in May 1963, to relay a message on the property claim issue from Prime Minister Ikeda. Although this source did not reveal the contents of the message, it could be assumed that the settlement of this issue was further negotiated after the Kim-Ōhira meeting on a secret level.

<sup>245</sup> Tanida Seikyū et al., 1966, p.25. Those precedents were set by the second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in March to April, 1960. Also this source mentioned the precedence of fishery agreement between Great Britain and Nordic countries around this period; This point was also confirmed by Confidential Source #6.

<sup>246</sup> Morita Yoshio, 1991, p. 273-4

through an arrangement made by Yatsugi Kazuo, in November 1963. Satō, although not in the Ikeda government then, urged the conclusion of the treaty within the year.<sup>247</sup> In March 1964, a meeting of Japanese and South Korean Agricultural Ministers was held. However, real progress was not made until the second meeting of Agricultural Ministers in March 1965, due to the South Korean fear of Japanese domination of Japan Sea fishing resources.<sup>248</sup>

Japanese domestic perspectives had a significant influence on the Japanese negotiating position during this period.<sup>249</sup> Political interests were especially influential in promoting political intervention after July 1962, as seen in the Kim-Ōhira meeting. Political involvement in the negotiating process had made a significant and positive impact on progress.<sup>250</sup> The previous lack of political involvement was due to caution on the part of the ruling party arising from Prime Minister Kishi's forced resignation following widespread public demonstrations against the conclusion of the Japan-United States Security Treaty. Politicians were unwilling to risk the same level of objections being raised against any normalisation agreement with South Korea. However, Cabinet Research Office polling in 1963 showed that over 30 per cent of Japanese didn't even know about the negotiations. By September 1965, following the normalisation and prior to its ratification by the Diet, a similar poll indicated that 58.9 per cent of Japanese had no opinion about the treaty, 10.8 per cent opposed it and

---

<sup>247</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, *op. cit.*, p. 280

<sup>248</sup> Tanida Seikyū et al., 1966, p.24. South Korea was particularly concerned about the differences in fishing capabilities between Japanese and South Korean fishing boats; the Japanese boats being superior and capable of larger catches.

<sup>249</sup> Although Confidential Source #6 "does not recall much more than the fact that some politicians and interest groups expressed their interest in this issue," he briefed those upon request. It shows that there was an increasing interest in the normalisation issue from different interest groups.

<sup>250</sup> Confidential Source #5 admitted that political intervention in the form of the Ōhira-Kim meeting, was 'effective' in terms of solving the biggest obstacle in the negotiations.



30.8 per cent agreed with it. These data indicate that most of the population were not strongly opposed to the treaty.<sup>251</sup>

The appointment of Sugi Michisuke, chairman of the Japan External Trade Organisation, to the head of negotiating team suggests the increasing influence of the business community on the negotiations and indicates an increasing willingness to settle the issue.<sup>252</sup> Business groups started to be actively interested in the negotiations. Teramoto has commented that; "It was since the establishment of the Park government that economic cooperation between Japan and South Korea became activated."<sup>253</sup> *Nihon keizai chōsa kyōgikai* (Japan Economic Research Council) published a report called *Kankokukeizai no genjyō* (The Present Situation of South Korea Economy) at the end of 1963. The report emphasised the advantages of Japanese companies utilising cheap labour in South Korea for developing high value added products.<sup>254</sup>

*Mindan's* activities might also have had some impact on the negotiating position of the Japanese government.<sup>255</sup> The Park regime also "strengthened its ties with the pro-South Koreans in Japan".<sup>256</sup> After 1964, pro-South Korean businessmen led by *Mindan* director Kwōn Il, were invited by Park Chung Hee to visit South Korea. After this, *Mindan* decided to cooperate with the Park Chung Hee

---

251 Naikaku kanbō naikaku chōsashitsu, *Nikkan jōyaku o meguru naigai no dōkō*, Naikaku kanbō naikaku chōsashitsu, Tokyo, 1966, p.160

252 Confidential Source #5 denied any direct influence by the business community on the negotiating position, but said that 'Sugi might have had contacts with the business community'.

253 Teramoto Mitsurō, 'Nikkan keizai kyōryoku wa dō shinten suruka', in *Asahi Jānaru*, May 16, 1965, p. 13

254 Teramoto Mitsurō, 1965, p. 15

255 Confidential Source #5 was convinced that there was no influence by the activities of Koreans in Japan, on the Japanese negotiating position. He did suggest that those activities had an influence on the South Korean negotiating position and, in this way, may have influenced the process.

256 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 152

government in implementing its first Five Year Economic Plan.<sup>257</sup> The competition between *Chōsōren* and *Mindan* "for the allegiance of the Korean minority in Japan" continued during 1962 and intensified towards the end of 1963, before the presidential elections in South Korea in 1963.<sup>258</sup>

At this time, the anti-normalisation movement in South Korea became a serious threat to the Park regime which had returned to quasi-civilian control following elections on December 17, 1963. The Japanese government was very supportive of the Park regime as they saw its tight political control of the nation as being favourable to a reasonable settlement. From the Japanese perspective, the regime could, more so than previous Korean administrations, ignore public opinion if the settlement was not as good from the Korean perspective. The Japanese government announced a US\$100 million loan to South Korea from Japan before the normalisation in order to assist the Park regime, by demonstrating that it had wrung a concession from the Japanese.<sup>259</sup> The negotiations progressed, but were terminated on April 6, 1964 by anti-normalisation student demonstrations in Seoul.<sup>260</sup>

Despite political, business and community interest in the normalisation during the negotiation, the legitimacy crisis of Park regime was serious enough to terminate the negotiations. However, those domestic influences in Japan were significant in promoting the negotiation, at this stage.

#### 4.3. Seventh Round Talks and the Conclusion of the Treaty

---

<sup>257</sup> *ibid.*, p. 152. Park promised Kwōn Il that "South Korea would do everything possible to advance the interests of the Koreans in Japan".

<sup>258</sup> *ibid.*, p. 155, 156

<sup>259</sup> Ko Jun-Sok, *op. cit.*, p. 97

<sup>260</sup> Gendaishi Kenkyūsho, *op. cit.*, p. 2; see also Maeda Toshikazu, *op. cit.*, p. 8

American pressure to finalise the normalisation negotiations increased considerably after the American commitment to the Vietnam War escalated following the Gulf of Tonkin crisis on August 3, 1964.<sup>261</sup> Satō Eisaku, who took over as Prime Minister after Ikeda resigned on the grounds of illness on November 9, 1964, visited the United States and promised to enforce the rapprochement. American pressure on Japan was reinforced by the decision of South Korea on January 18, 1965 to send 2000 soldiers to Vietnam to back the American effort to support the South Vietnamese regime. A Second meeting of Japanese and South Korean Agricultural Ministers was held from March 3.

South Koreans initially stressed the disadvantages South Koreans fishermen would suffer after the abolition of the 'Peace Line'. Japanese, on the other hand, suggested a more 'realistic measure for fishery restriction', such as a 12 sea mile fishery line, considering the actual amount of fishing engaged in by Japanese. The South Koreans responded by showing readiness to accept this Japanese idea.<sup>262</sup> Apart from the 12 sea mile fishery line, inclusion of fishery cooperation and approximately US\$30 million in economic cooperation agreed at Ōhira-Kim meeting was suggested.<sup>263</sup> On March 18, Secretary of State Rusk and the head of the Republic of Korea Foreign Ministry made a

---

<sup>261</sup> Sakamoto Yoshikazu, *op. cit.*, p. 54. He argued that the United States "made an extraordinary effort to bring about early normalization of Japanese-Korean relations during the last two weeks of September 1964." This was because; "The United States openly attempted to facilitate normalization talks at that particular time, not simply because the Park regime faced a serious financial crisis, but more significantly because enormous Sino-American tensions had arisen following the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and because Washington anticipated that China would conduct a nuclear test in the autumn". Also Confidential Source #5. Almost all the primary sources interviewed showed hesitancy in talking about the American influence on the negotiating position. However, this source said that Americans seemed to have often contacted the Japanese through embassies in regard to the negotiations, although denying the direct interference of America. This would support the view that the United States took a steady interest in the issue and that the Japanese were sensitive to their interests. However, it is difficult to gauge the degree of influence from these sources.

<sup>262</sup> Tanida Seikyū et al., 1966, p.25-26

<sup>263</sup> *ibid.*, p.57



joint communique on early rapprochement between South Korea and Japan. On May 16, 1965, Park Chung Hee met United States President Johnson and promised South Korean assistance for the United States in its involvement in the Vietnam War and the early conclusion of a normalisation treaty with Japan.

The establishment of the Satō government on November 9, 1964, sped up the negotiations. The Seventh Round Talks were opened on December 3, 1964. A meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Satō and South Korean Prime Minister Chon Il Kwon was held on February 6, 1965. In February, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shina also visited South Korea. Shina made an apologetic announcement on his arrival that; "It was very sad that there was an unhappy period in the long history of Japan and South Korea, and I deeply regret it."<sup>264</sup> Shina, on the authority of Prime Minister Satō, succeeded in reaching an agreement with the South Korean Foreign Minister to sign an interim normalisation treaty.<sup>265</sup> Thus, the interim treaty was signed on February 20, 1965 in Seoul. The extensive negotiations for concluding the treaty itself were carried out by both Japanese and South Korean officials<sup>266</sup>, and these were followed by the conclusion of other specific treaties on June 22 at the Japanese Prime Minister's residence in Tokyo. The Japanese interests reflected in the negotiation of the Seventh Round Talks were overwhelmingly political, as seen in the visits and

---

264 Maeda Toshikazu, op. cit., p. 9

265 ibid., pp. 9-11

266 Confidential Source #5 said that despite the resolution of the South Korean property claim by the Ōhira-Kim meeting in 1962, negotiations continued even to the stage of the wording of the treaty, which still revealed conflict over issues such as the basic relations between Japan and South Korea, the legal status of Koreans in Japan and the fishery agreement. Especially in respect of the issues concerning Japanese colonisation of Korea, there was a conflict of interests. South Korea wanted to state that Japanese colonialism had been illegal since the signing of the Treaty of Protection (*hogo jōyaku*) forced on Korea in 1905, but Japan maintained that it was legal. They settled on wording that the colonisation was 'already null and void'; also Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 320-322, 328-343. Because of this negotiation after the Ōhira-Kim meeting, South Korea succeeded in increasing the \$US100 million low interest, long term, officially approved investment loans from private sources promised at the meeting to \$US300 million.

announcements of United States, Japanese and South Korean politicians. Also, the influence of business groups is evident in the Japanese negotiating position. The Japanese representatives in the negotiating team for the Seventh Round Talks included Takasugi Shin'ichi, an adviser to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and also the chairman of the *Keidanren* Committee on Economic Co-operation.<sup>267</sup> Also, a general research organisation for business groups in Japan, *Nihon keizai chōsa kyōgikai* (Japan Economic Research Council) was responsible for designing the Japan-South Korea economic cooperation framework.<sup>268</sup>

Apart from the political and economic interest, there was an interest in the normalisation from Defence Agency. This military interest was reflected in *Mitsuya Kenkyū* (Research on the Three Arrows Scenario), which was completed in 1963. This 1419 page research paper was a strategic plan which hypothesises an attack by North Korea, and a Japanese, South Korean and United States response to this attack.<sup>269</sup> The Defence Ministry was also interested in access to strategic information on North Korea provided by South Korean military forces after the normalisation.<sup>270</sup> This interest was in line with the American concern to integrate its allied defence mechanism in Asia.<sup>271</sup> Although

---

<sup>267</sup> In conducting this research, officials of *Keidanren* were contacted. When questioned, these officials maintained that the negotiation was 'a government' matter, and *Keidanren* did not have anything to do with it. However, the existence of the 'economic cooperation' bureau in *Keidanren*, as well as Takasugi's presence in the negotiation team, could only mean that the economic community's interests were reflected both through formal and informal participation in the treaty process. This issue of *Keidanren's* role is worthy of further research; see also Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p. 310

<sup>268</sup> Nakagawa Nobuo (b), 'Kankoku keizai no genjitsu to keizai kyōryoku', in *Gendai no me*, October 1965, p. 79

<sup>269</sup> Fujishima Udai (b), 'Mitsuya kenkyū sono shirarezaru bubun', in *Gendai no me*, April 1965, pp. 124-125

<sup>270</sup> 'The comment by General Yoshie Sei-ichi' in *Chosen Kenkyū*, vol. 41, July 1965, p. 45

<sup>271</sup> Hatada Shigeo (b), 'Nikkan kaidan to bei kyokutō senryaku', in *Ajia afurika kōza III nihon to chōsen*, ed Hatada Takashi, Keisō shobō, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 124-125. He quotes the comment by United States Assistant Secretary for Defense, Gil Patrick, that the United States expected Japan to fill the gap in the northeast Pacific in time for United States troops to be mobilised to deal with regional disputes. He also cites Patrick as saying that the United States expects Japan to develop naval power sufficient to protect the Korean Peninsula. McCormack

the military alliance between Japan and South Korea did not require the normalisation of diplomatic relations, since it was established by the security alliances between Japan and United States in 1951 and between South Korea and United States in 1954, the military interest of the Japanese Defence Agency might have had some impact in promoting the normalisation issue, particularly within the right wing of the LDP which supported the *Pusan akahata ron* (Red Flags in Pusan Theory).

The lack of support for opposition parties who advocated the anti-normalisation activities, was also one of the reasons for the Liberal Democratic Party to conclude the treaty. According to *Naikaku kanbō naikaku chōsashitsu* (Cabinet Research Office), the anti-normalisation movement failed due to the split between *Sohyō* (The Federation of Labour Unions), Socialist Party and Communists.<sup>272</sup> They split because of a conflict which arose from the Sino-USSR dispute. *Anpo kokumin kaigi* (the Anti-Japan-United States Security Treaty Forum), which continued the movement from 1960, succeeded in getting 100,000 signatures for submission to the Diet to petition it not to normalise relations with South Korea. However, its attention shifted to anti-nuclear issues due to American nuclear submarine movements through Japan, and so, its power in respect of the normalisation issue declined after its peak in 1963.<sup>273</sup>

---

and Halliday comment that; " William Bundy, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of state, is on record as saying that if activity broke out again on the 38th Parallel, 'this time the Japanese army goes.' in Halliday, Jon and McCormack, Gavan, *Japanese Imperialism Today Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 100

<sup>272</sup> Naikaku kanbō naikaku chōsashitsu, *Nikkan jyōyaku teiketsu o meguru naigai no dōkō*, Naikaku kanbō naikaku chōsashitsu, 1966, p. 23

<sup>273</sup> Hatada Shigeo (c), 'Nikkan kaidan hantai tōsō no tenkai to sono rekishiteki yakuwari', in *Ajia afurika kōza III nihon to chōsen*, ed. Hatada Takashi, Keisō shobō, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 192-197



The lack of interest from intellectuals, despite objections by some, also failed to inhibit the conclusion of the treaty. Five prominent intellectuals; Abe Tomoji(an author), Kobayashi Naoki(a lawyer), Nakano Yoshio(a social critic), Nogamo Shigekichirō(a physicist), and Hidaka Rokurō(sociologist), attempted to unite the labour unions, the socialists and the communists, but failed.<sup>274</sup> *Anpo hihan no kai* (the Association to Criticise the Japan-United States Security Treaty), an organisation of intellectuals, published a pamphlet *Shiranai ma ni - nikkan kaidan no motarasumono* - (While You Are Ignorant About It- the Possible Consequences of Japanese-South Korean Normalisation) - on October 10, 1962, and sold 10,000 copies. This organisation also held a symposium on October 16 the same year, mobilising 400 people. This demonstrated a resounding lack of interest by the public in the intellectual lobby against the treaty. The issue of American nuclear submarine visiting Japan affected the intellectuals' opinions, too and diverted their attention from the normalisation issue. Nine scientists, including Yukawa Hideki, a Nobel laureat in physics, made an announcement on March 25, 1965, opposing United States nuclear submarine visiting Japan, but this appears to have had not substantial impact on the normalisation treaty negotiations.<sup>275</sup>

Anti-normalisation movements did not probably have much appeal to the ordinary people, who might have supported Ikeda and Satō's economic policy and 'friendship' with a neighbouring country.

<sup>274</sup> Hirotzu Kyōsuke, 'Nikkan jyōyaku hijyun hantai tōsō no jittai' in *Toki no kadai*, October 1965, p. 17-18

<sup>275</sup> Hatada Shigeo (c), op. cit., p. 192

## 5: CONCLUSION

Major turning points in the Japanese negotiating position seemed to have occurred when the 'Clark Line' was abolished in 1953, when Kishi came in power in 1957, and when Prime Minister Ikeda solidified his base after the elections in July 1962.

When the 'Clark Line' was abolished and the capture of Japanese fishermen and fishing boats escalated there was considerable domestic political pressure to resolve this issue. The Japanese prime interest in the negotiation then became the fisheries issue.<sup>276</sup> The second change in the Japanese negotiating position was provoked by the establishment of the Kishi government which wanted to resolve the normalisation issue quickly. A pro-United States stance and an interest in South Korea as a buffer zone for Japanese security were shared by both Kishi and Ikeda. Kishi pursued those objectives by concluding the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1960, but following the large scale anti-Security Treaty movement and the subsequent resignation of Kishi, Ikeda was forced to be more cautious in his approach to the issue. His victory in the election of July 1962 solidified his political base and enabled him to take more active measures. This third change in the negotiating position of the Japanese government brought the negotiations to a political level, resulting in the Ōhira-Kim Memorandum of November 1962. Through this, the biggest obstacle to normalisation, the issue of property claims, was thus eliminated. It was then only a matter of time for South Korea to give up the 'Peace Line', a severe provocation to the Japanese, following this agreement.

---

<sup>276</sup> Confidential Source #5 said that 'all the issues' were important for the conclusion of the normalisation treaty. The influence of the massive capture of Japanese vessels and fishermen by South Korea on the attitude of politicians was obvious. Probably, given the general attitude of the bureaucracy to the negotiations, the influence of this issue was limited to the political level.

The reason why it took three years for the treaty to be concluded after this agreement was: (1) the anti-Japanese feeling of the South Korean people; (2) the legitimacy crisis of the Park Chung Hee government; and (3) the sensitivity of the Ikeda government to public objections following the demonstrations against the ratification of changes to the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1960. The American influence in helping suppress the South Korean anti-normalisation movement<sup>277</sup> and its support for the Park regime in its normalising relations with Japan, was therefore significant in enabling the conclusion of the treaty in June 1965.

An examination of American influence on the negotiating position of the Japanese government, makes it apparent that at the most basic level, (1) United States East Asian policy consistently sought the normalisation of bilateral relations between the two nations, (2) the American role in the negotiation process was as an intermediary between Japan and South Korea, and (3) United States East Asian policy was significant in that it provided a framework for Japanese and South Korean bilateral policies.

However, it is also evident that the intermediary role of the United States was often manipulated by both Japan and South Korea. This might be explained by Japan and South Korea fighting for United States support for economic development and re-integration into the international community. It is quite obvious that whereas American influence on the normalisation process was consistent, it also waxed and waned. It would be simplistic to see the American role as one of the United States instructing its client states, Japan and South Korea, to

---

<sup>277</sup> Kim Dong-Jo, op. cit., p.290. According to Kim Dong-Jo, Bundy said that US Ambassador Brown would 'convince' the opposition to understand the necessity of resolving the normalisation issue.



conclude a treaty. If this was the case, the treaty would have been concluded at the same time as the Japan-Republic of China Normalisation Treaty which was commenced at the same time as the Japan-Republic of Korea Normalisation Treaty and concluded after one year. However, this was not the case.

American influence vacillated depending on a number of factors: the domestic situation in Japan and South Korea; the nature of the current American Administration; the influence of particular international strategic events ( especially United States involvement in Korea and Vietnam); the strength of the United States, Korean, Japanese and international economies, and the willingness of the South Korean and Japanese administrations in co-operating with the United States. Any American influence must be seen within the context of the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan, including its historical aspects, and as being limited by the strong domestic influences, including the bureaucratic and domestic political factors operating within both those nations.

It cannot be denied that Japanese and South Korean policies were formed on the basis of their ties with the United States both militarily and economically. However, American influence on Japan and South Korea on the normalisation issue was limited by Japan and South Korea struggling for United States' intervention on their behalf. When the United States supported one side, the other side often criticised it or simply avoided reaching an agreement. Therefore, American influence was not so effective in those areas where the interests of Japan and South Korea were in conflict, such as the property claims issue. The United States therefore principally exerted its influence indirectly. The shift of United States East Asian policy around 1960 to

reduce its financial support for South Korea and Japan substantially changed the South Korean stance. The agreement on the property claim was reached at the time as South Korea needed to secure economic support which it could do so by compromising with Japan and thus opening its economy to more Japanese investment and trade.

The major influences on the Japanese negotiating position were political objectives and the interpretation by the bureaucracy, especially the Foreign, Finance and Justice Ministries of the national interest. The negotiating position was determined by Japanese East Asian policy objectives, economic development of Japan, as well as by the interests of politicians and bureaucrats. From the beginning of the negotiations to the emergence of the Kishi government, the interests of politicians and bureaucrats were shared, i.e. to minimise payments associated with imperialist expansion and the war so as to bring about an early economic recovery. However, the interests of these two groups came into conflict during the Kishi government; Kishi promoting the negotiations, while bureaucrats resisted it. The conflict was resolved in the 1960s when the objectives of both politicians and bureaucrats were united under the banner of further economic development by establishing full economic relations with South Korea.

Non-government influences on the Japanese negotiating position were provided by business groups, intellectuals, and community groups. The negotiating position of the government from after the Korean War to around 1960, shows that Japanese interest groups were beginning to have a periodically significant effect on Japanese foreign policy. The capture of fishermen and fishing boats by South Korea is the strongest example, and *Chōsōren* (The Association of North

Koreans Resident in Japan)'s activity to effect the repatriation of Koreans to DPRK also had a significant effect during this period.

After the regime change in South Korea in 1960 began promoting a more pro-Japanese atmosphere, Japanese business interest in South Korea had a significant impact on the negotiating position of the Japanese government, which appointed businessmen as representatives of the negotiating teams at both the Sixth and Seventh Round Talks. However, the activities by Koreans in Japan to improve their treatment and the political and intellectual opposition to the normalisation had little impact on the negotiating position of the Japanese government.

After evaluating the influences of United States East Asian policy, South Korean and Japanese domestic issues on the Japanese negotiating position in the process of finalising the normalisation treaty, it can be concluded that:

- American policy influence was consistent and varied in strength over the course of the negotiation process. It established an international policy framework for the negotiations, but was not pre-eminent in influencing the course of the negotiations. The American concentration on developing the Japanese economy and establishing an economically and militarily strong Japan as the centre of its East Asian policy in the 1950's weakened as Japan refused the larger role the United States tried to force on it. In the 1960s, Japan's refusal to go along with the Pacific security alliance, the purposeful limitations it placed on its armed forces, its reluctance to fully meet the cost of American bases in Japan, contrasted with the Korean willingness to maintain strong



domestic military forces, to actively participate in American strategic initiatives and to provide troops for the Vietnam War. These changes in the bilateral relations between the United States and its two allies also influenced the nature of American pressure to resolve the normalisation issue.

- Direct American influence on Japanese politicians was weak.<sup>278</sup> Although there is substantial evidence that the United States Central Intelligence Agency provided funds to particular politicians (including Kishi and Satō among others), the nature of Japanese politics and the highly factionalised nature of the LDP, could not guarantee any substantial consistent influence over the domestic political agenda, which was, in any case, very conservative.
- Japanese politicians played a major role in the most crucial period of the negotiations. If the negotiations had been left to bureaucrats, it could have taken much more time to settle the negotiations, since their interest was in winning as perfect a bargain as possible for Japan, on property claims, the fishery issue and the issue of the legal status of Koreans in Japan.<sup>279</sup> On the other hand, appreciation of the political situation in South Korea, of American strategic and economic needs as well as an understanding of Japanese domestic demands encouraged politicians to utilise the opportunity provided

---

<sup>278</sup> Even the American interpretation of San Francisco Treaty Article 4 in 1957 was not influential enough to settle the negotiation. Probably it was the most influential of the direct interventions made by the United States as Confidential Source #5 said; also Confidential Source #6 said that they "took American East Asian policy into consideration when making Japanese policies, but were not influenced by it."

<sup>279</sup> Confidential Source #6 said that the prime interest for 'them' was in the Japanese national interest, which stressed; "(1) political stability in Japan, as well as pursuit of the economic interests of Japan; and (2) maintaining friendly relations with the United States." Bureaucrats were probably aware of the necessity to compromise, in order to pursue (2), but were unwilling to compromise on (1). This dilemma might have resulted in them leaving the crucial negotiations to the politicians and supporting those initiatives.

by the coincidence of a number of interests for Japan to conclude the normalisation treaty.

- Regime changes in South Korea and the development of the South Korean economy were influential in determining the rate of the negotiations. The development of the South Korean economy became a particularly important, indirect influence on the Japanese government as interest grew among business groups to increase investment in South Korea and to draw South Korea into the zone of projection of the Japanese economy as it accelerated in the 1960s. It is also obvious that South Korean domestic political and economic issues had an important bearing on the way Japan negotiated the treaty. Although some of these issues, and Japanese reactions to them, have been indicated, their fuller examination is beyond the scope of this thesis.
- Domestic influences on the negotiation process changed over the course of the talks. In the early years to 1960, the process was essentially controlled by the bureaucrats, particularly the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry.<sup>280</sup> Community, academic and business influences were few, if any, and had no noticeable effects on the negotiation process. This changed when the fisheries problems arising from the 'Peace Line' became a domestic political issue, prompting politicians to become more involved. Shortly

---

<sup>280</sup> Johnson. Chalmers, 1975, pp. 79. It was characteristic of these ministries that they followed a particularly bureaucratic view of the outcomes they wanted from the negotiations and that in pursuing these, political and community viewpoints were basically ignored as has been demonstrated. This dominance by the bureaucracy is characteristic of a political system in which politicians are traditionally reactive rather than proactive, a view which is also demonstrated by the lack of political initiative in progressing the negotiations until the fisheries issue had a political impact. This dominance of the bureaucracy in the policy domain is well documented, particularly by Johnson. "... in the 1950s and 1960s, the bureaucrats knew more about public policy than the politicians ... as a result the tradition developed that the politicians reign but the bureaucrats rule." Therefore, the power of the various ministries in controlling the negotiations cannot be underestimated. However, because of their unwillingness to admit other viewpoints in the negotiations, no progress could be made on the major obstacle of the property claim until political intervention had occurred.

after, an increasing interest in South Korea on the part of *Keidanren* stimulated business interest in normalisation. It was therefore only in the latter part of the process that broader domestic influences came to bear on the negotiation process.

We can therefore conclude that while United States East Asian policy was an influence on the negotiation process, it was not the dominant influence and was, sometimes, subject to both South Korean and Japanese domestic political imperatives as detailed above.

## 2. Secondary Sources

'CIA Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's' in *New York Times*, October 9, 1994, p.1.

'Kankoku kokkai ni okeru nikkan ryaku roni', ed. Inaba Sei-ichi, *Honfusa jissai*, Vol.37, September 1963, pp.56-62.

'Kim-Chiwa memo', in *Dong-A ilbo*, June 22, 1991.

'Shiryo I nikkan syogyaku kyotei Gyon shiro to kankai shiryō', in *Shiryo shon to chōsen I - nikkan mondai o kangaru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Uda, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.286-305.

'Shiryo II nikkan ryaku ni tsukuru hantai sangyo kyōshi seimeisho', in *Shiryo shon to chōsen I - nikkan mondai o kangaru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Uda, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.306-316.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### 1. Primary Sources

Kim Dong-Jo, *Nikkan kōshō 14 nen no kiroku*, trans. Hayashi Takehiko, Simul shuppankai, Tokyo, 1993.

Maeda Toshikazu, 'Nikkan kokkō seijyōka mae no jitsujō' in *Keizai to gaikō*, July 1985, pp.2-11.

Morita Yoshio, 'Nikkan kokkō seijōka kōshō' in *Nippon koria tokuhon*, eds. Hayashi Takehiko and Abe Yō, Kyōiku kaihatsu kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1991, pp.267-279.

Naikaku kanbō naikaku chōsashitsu, *Nikkan jōyaku teiketsu o meguru naigai no dōkō*, Naikaku kanbō naikaku chōsashitsu, 1966, pp.23-205.

Ōno Katsumi, *Kasumigaseki gaikō - sono dentō to hitobito*, Nihon keizai shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1978.

Tanida Seikyū et al., *Toki no hōrei bessatsu nikkā jōyaku to kokunai hō no kaisetsu*, Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, Tokyo, 1966.

### 2. Secondary Sources

'CIA Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's' in *New York Times*, October 9, 1994, p.1.

'Kankoku kokkai ni okeru nikkā jōyaku rongi', ed. Inaba Sei-ichi, *Hōritsu jihō*, Vol.37, September 1965, pp.56-62.

'Kim-Ōhira memo', in *Dong-A Ilbo*, June 22, 1991.

'Shiryō I nikkā syōjōyaku kyōtei (kyū shin) to kankei shiryō', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkā mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.286-305.

'Shiryō II nikkā jōyaku ni taisuru hantai sengen oyobi seimeisho', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkā mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.306-316.

'The coment by General Yoshie Sei-ichi' in *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.41, July 1965, p.45.

Abe Hirozumi et al.(b), 'Anpo taisei', in *Nihon gaikōshi II*, ed. Abe Hirozumi et al., Mainichi shinbun sha, Tokyo, 1974, p.558.

Abe Hirozumi et al., 'Nikkan jōyaku', in *Nihon gaikōshi II*, ed. Abe Hirozumi et al., Mainichi shinbun sha, Tokyo, 1974, p.559-576.

Asagi Munenori and Ide Isei, 'Nikkan jōyaku sansei-ron hantai-ron no konkyo o tou', in *Asahi jānaru*, October 10, 1965, pp.5-13.

Australian Government Publishing Service, *Style Manual* (Fourth Edn), AGPS Press, Canberra, 1988.

Barnds, William J., 'Old Issues in a New Context', in ed. Barnds, William J., *The Two Koreas and the Role of the United States East Asian Policy*, New York Univeristy Press, New York, 1976, p.12.

Calder, Kent E., 'Kanryō vs Shomin: Contrasting Dynamics of Conservative Leadership in Postwar Japan', in ed. MacDougall, Terry Edward, *Political Leadership in Contemporary Japan*, Center for Japanese Studies, Michigan, p.15.

Campbell, Creighton John, 'Bureaucratic Primacy: Japanese Policy Communities in an American Perspective', *Governance*, Vol.2, No.1, January 1989, p.12.

Chang Young-Gil, *The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and Korea and the Role of the United States East Asian Policy*, U.M.I. Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, 1975.

Chōsen daigakkō, *Kan-nichi kaidan no honshitsu ni tsuite - sono keika to haikei ni kansuru kōsatsu*, Chōsen daigakkō, Tokyo, 1961, pp.6-47.

Chōsen jihō tokubetsu shuzai han, "*Kan-nichi kankei*" no saikentō - 40 nen no kiseki, Chōsen seinen sha, Tokyo, 1985, pp.41-57.

Chōsen kenkyū hen, 'Shiryō (2) "nikkan jōyaku" hon chōin ni kansuru seifu to jimintō no seimei', in *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.42, August 1965, pp.47-49.

Chōsen kenkyū hen, 'Shiryō (1) "nikkan jōyaku" hon chōin ni kansuru sei-in', in *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.42, August 1965, pp.42-46.

Chōsen tōitsu mondai kenkyūkai hen, *Gunji ittai ka - kiken na dōmei*, Bansei sha, Tokyo, 1978. pp.78-234.

Chōsen tōitsu mondai kenkyūkai hen, *Shirīzu nikkān mondai 7 yuchaku no tsuikyū - kokkai gijiroku*, Bansei sha, Tokyo, 1978. pp.13-24.

Chun Kyun-Mo, *Kiro ni tatsu kankoku - chūkan kessan (paku shasatsu) go no yukusue*, Mirai sha, Tokyo, 1980.

Cole, David C., and Lyman, Princeton N., *Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics*, Harvard University Press, 1971, pp.98-118.

Covell, Jon Carter, and Covell, Alan, *Korean Impact on Japanese Culture: Japan's Hidden History*, Hollym International Corp, Elizabeth, New Jersey, 1984.

Craig, Albert M., 'Aspects of Government Bureaucracy', in ed. Vogel, Ezra F., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975, p.20.

Cumings, Bruce, 'The Wicked Witch of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East', in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Hogan, Michael J., Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992, pp.87-101.

Dower, John W., 'The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan in and out of the Pentagon Papers', in *The Pentagon Papers*, vol.V, eds. Chomsky. Noam and Zinn. Howard, Beacon Press, Boston, 1972, pp.101-142.

Eckert, Carter J. et al., *Korea Old and New: A History*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp.389-399.

Eguchi Bokurō, 'Nikkān kaidan soshi tōsō no seitōsei', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 2 - nihon ni uttaeru*, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1966, pp.38-53.

Fuji-i Heigo et al., 'Zadankai - nikkān keizai kyōryoku no shōten to tenbō', in *Sekai jōnaru*, March 1963, pp.56-61.

Fuji-i Heigo, 'Nikkān kokkō eno zaikai no shin-i', *Gendai no me*, October 1965, pp.58-66.

Fuji-i Shōji, 'Isshi hōshū tai-in no tanjō', *Toki no kadai*, December 1965, pp.16-22.

Fujishima Udai (b), 'Mitsuya kenkyū sono shirarezaru bubun', *Gendai no me*, April 1965, pp.124-131.

Fujishima Udai (c), 'Himerareta nikkān kaidan no haikei', *Gendai no me*, June 1965, pp.140-148.



Fujishima Udai (d), "'Nikkan jōyaku" wa nanboku tōitsu o sogai shinai to seifu ga iunowa hontōka', *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.42, August 1965, pp.1-9.

Fujishima Udai (e), 'Nikkan kihon jōyaku no hōteki seikaku', in *Asahi jōnaru*, October 10, 1965, pp.46-50.

Fujishima Udai, 'Kankoku no gekidō to nihon - nikkān jōyaku seiritsu no haikai', in *Shirizu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkān mondai o kangaeru*, ed. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, 1965, pp.27-76.

Fujiwara Akira, 'Nichi=kan=bei no gunji taisei to nikkān jōyaku', in *Shirizu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkān mondai o kangaeru*, ed. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, 1965, pp.149-162.

Fukumoto, op. cit. Masamichi Inoki, 'The Civil Bureaucracy', in eds Ward, Robert E., and Rustow, Dankwart A., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964, pp.283-87.

Gendaishi kenkyūsho hen, *Nikkān jōyaku no mikata*, Gendaishi kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1965, pp.1-10.

Gordon, Bernard K., 'Japan: Searching Once Again', in *Asia Pacific in the New World Politics*, ed. Hsiung, James C., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1993, pp.49-70.

Ha Young-Sun, 'America-Korean Military Relations: Continuity and Change', in *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, pp.111-132.

Hahn Bae-Ho, 'Major Issues in the American-Korean Alliance', in *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, pp.91-110.

Haley, John O., 'Governance by Negotiation: A Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.13, No.2, Summer 1987, p.344.

Halliday, Jon and McCormack, Gavan, *Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-prosperity in Greater East Asia*, Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, 1973, pp.34, 72-73.

Han Sung-Joo, 'Policy Towards the United States', in *The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Han Sung-joo, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, pp.139-155.

Han Woo-Keun, *The History of Korea*, trans. Lee Kyung-Shik, ed. Mints, Grafton K., University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1970.

Hara Akira, 'Sensō baishō mondai to ajia', in *Iwanami kōza kindai nihon to shokuminchi 8 ajia no reisen to datsu shokuminchika*, eds. Ōe Shinobu et al., Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1993, pp.183-216.

Hatada Shigeo (b), 'Nikkan kaidan to bei kyokutō senryaku', in *Ajia afurika kōza III nihon to chōsen*, ed. Hatada Takashi, Keisōshobō, Tokyo, 1965, pp.119-131.

Hatada Shigeo (c), 'Nikkan kaidan hantai tōsō no tenkai to sono rekishiteki yakuwari', in *Ajia afurika kōza III nihon to chōsen*, ed. Hatada Takashi, Keisōshobō, Tokyo, 1965, pp.159-207.

Hatada Shigeo, "'Nikkan jōyaku wa zenzen gunjiteki shikisai o motanai ka', in *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.42, August 1965, pp.10-14.

Hatada Takashi (b), "'Nikkan yūkō" to nikkans jōyaku', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkans mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.7-26.

Hatada Takashi (c), 'Nikkan kaidan no gidai', in *Kokusai mondai shirīzu 27 nikkans kōshō - sono keika to mondaiten*, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, 1962, pp.88-118.

Hatada Takashi et al., 'Nikkan kaidan no rekishi', in *Ajia afurika kōza III nihon to chōsen*, ed. Hatada Takashi, Keisō shobō, Tokyo, 1965, pp.49-87.

Hatada Takashi, Bunkazai oyobi bunka kyōtei ni kansuru kyōtei', *Hōritsu jihō*, vol.37, September 1965, pp.35-37.

Hayashi Katsuya, 'Nikkans jōyaku no gunjiteki kikensei', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkans mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.163-184.

Henderson, Gregory, 'North and South Korea', in *Conflict in World Politics*, eds. Spiegel, Steven L. and Waltz, Kenneth N., Winthrop Publishers, Massachusettes, 1971, pp.197-219.

Higuchi Yūichi (b), 'Nikkans keizai - seikyūken kyōtei to kongo no nikkans keizai kyōryoku', in *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.41, July 1965, pp.11, 15.

Higuchi Yūichi, 'Nihon dokusenshihon no taikan keizai shinshutsu', in *Ajia afurika kōza III nihon to chōsen*, Keisō shobō, Tokyo, 1965, pp.132-156.

- Hirobe Kazuya et al., 'Shiryō nikkan kaidan 14 nen no kiseki', in *Hōritsu jihō*, vol.37, September 1965, pp.45-55.
- Hirotsu Kyōsuke, 'Nikkan jōyaku hijyun hantai tōsō no jittai', *Toki no kadai*, October 1965, pp.14-19.
- Imazu Hiroshi (b), 'Taiketsu no kamae to bimyō na naijō: hijyun suishin to soshi no ugoki', *Asahi jōnaru*, October 10, 1965, pp.22-24.
- Imazu Hiroshi et al., "'Seijiteki seikaku" to "kaishaku no kuichigai" - jōyaku o meguru sōten', in *Asahi jōnaru*, October 10, 1965, pp.17-22.
- Imazu Hiroshi, "'15 nen kōshō" saishū dankai e', *Asahi jōnaru*, 10 October 1965, pp.14-17.
- Inoguchi Tadashi, 'Bureaucrats and Politicians: shifting Influence', in eds. Okimoto, Daniel I., and Rohlen, Thomas P., *Inside the Japanese Systems: Reading on Contemporary Society and Political Economy*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1988, pp.185-6.
- Ishikawa Shigeru et al., 'Nikkan kōshō no kihonteki saikentō', *Sekai*, April 1964, pp.18-58.
- Ishimoto Yasuo, 'Nikkan jōyaku no hōteki kōzō', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkan mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.93-120.
- Itō Daiichi, *Gendai nihon kanryōsei no bunseki*, Toyo University Press, Tokyo, 1980, p.20.
- Iwatsu Keisuke, *Janru betsu saishin nichī-bei hyōgen jiten*, Shōgakukan, Tokyo, 1984.
- Jiyūsekai henshūbu, 'Fujishima Udai - "nikkan mondai" de na o uru hokusen no daibensha', *Jiyūsekai*, December 1965, p.82.
- Johnson, Chalmers, *MITI and Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1982, p. 46.
- Johnson, Chalmers, 'Japan: Who Governs?: An Essay on Official Bureaucracy', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.2, No.1, 1975, pp.21-28.
- Kamiya Fuji, 'The northern territories: 130 years of Japanese talks with Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union', *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, ed. Zagoria, Donald S., Yale University Press, 1982, p.142.



Kasai Nobusachi, 'Nikkan keizai kankei no henshen - izon to jiritsu no sōkoku', in *Posuto reisen no chōsen hantō*, ed. Okonogi Masao, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1994, pp.325-348.

Katō Kunio, 'Keiki shigeki toiu na no tai "kan" keizai shinshutsu - zaikai wa hijyun made matenai -', *Chōsen kenkyū*, July 1965, pp.12-14.

Kawagoshi Keizō, 'Taikan keizai kyōryoku no honshitsu to nerai', *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.42, August 1965, pp.15-20.

Kawakami Samao, 'Ōzume ni kita nikkan kaidan', *Toki no kadai*, May 1964, pp.12-15.

Keohand, R., and Nye, J., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1972.

Kil Soong-Hoom, 'Japan in American-Korean Relations', in *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation*, eds. Koo Youngnok and Suh Dae-Sook, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1984, pp.152-171.

Kim Kwan-Bong, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971.

Kim Man-Pong, *Park Chung Hee sono dokusai to fuhai*, Eiru shuppansha, Tokyo, 1976, pp.216-222.

Kimura Shūzō, 'Nikkan kōshō no kei-i', in *Nikkan kankei no tenkai*, ed. Tanaka Naokichi, Yūhikaku, Tokyo, 1963, pp.110-127.

Kishida Jun'nosuke, 'Amerika no kyokutō senryaku - futatabi makunamara hōkoku ni sokushite -', *Sekai*, April 1964, pp.85-96.

Ko Jun-Sok, *Sengo chō-nichi kankeishi - kaihō chōsen to nihon*, Shakai hyōron sha, Tokyo, 1987.

Koh Byung-Chul, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984, pp.214-215.

Koo Youngnok, 'The Conduct of Foreign Affairs', in *Korean Politics in Transition*, ed Wright, Edward Reynolds, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1975, pp.220-222.

Krauss, Ellis S., 'Political Economy: Policymaking and Industrial Policy in Japan', *Political Science and Politics*, March 1992, p.47.

Lee Byong-Ju, *Cūdetā paku chun hi to sono jidai*, trans. Agō Yōko and Chung Kyung-Mo, Shiarehim sha, Tokyo, 1992.

Lee Chong-sik, *Sengo nikkā kankeishi*, trans. Okonogi Masao, and Furuta Hiroshi, Chūkō sōsho, Tokyo, 1989.

Lee Jongwon, 'Sengo beikoku no kyokutō seisaku to kankoku no datsu shokuminchi ka', in *Iwanami kōza kindai nihon to shokuminchi 8 ajia no reisen to shokuminchika*, eds. Ōe Shinobu et al., Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1993, pp.3-38.

Lim, Hyun-Chin, *Dependent Development in Korea 1963-1979*, Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 1985, pp.82-88.

Maitani Ken'ichirō, 'Nikkā keizai kyōryoku wa seiritsu suruka', *Gendai no me*, September 1965, pp.84-94.

Maki, John M., 'The Role of Bureaucracy in Japan', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 20, December 1947, pp.397.

Maswood, Javed, 'Japanese Policies', in *Eastern Asia: An Introductory History*, ed. Mackerras, Colin, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1992, pp.364-365.

Mazaki Mitsuharu, *Kokusai mondai shirizu 27 nikkā kōshō - sono keika to mondai ten*, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1962, pp.3-47.

McCormack, Gavan, 'Japan and South Korea, 1965-75: Ten Years of Normalisation', in *Korea North and South: The Deepening Crisis*, eds. McCormack, Gavan and Selden, Mark, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978, pp.171-187.

McDonald, Donald Stone, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society*, Westview Press, Colorado, 1990, pp.236-268.

Miko Kiyonao et al., 'Kaisetsu nikkā jōyaku', *Hōritsu jihō*, vol.37, September 1965, pp.63-85.

Mitani Shizuo, 'Nihon to kankoku kitachōsen tonō kankei', in *Chōsen hantō no seiji keizai kōzō*, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1983, pp.190-193.

Mitchell, Richard H., *The Korean Minority in Japan*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967, pp.119-156.

Miterai Tatsuo, 'Nikkā kōshō o kyōshi suru', in *Toki no kadai*, May 1964, pp.8-11.

Miyazaki Shigeki, 'Zainichi kankokujin no hōteki chi-i', in *Juristo*, vol.327, August 1965, pp.24-27.

Mori Hiroshi and Yazawa Shūjirō, *Kanryōsei no shihai*, Yūhikaku, Tokyo, 1981.

Morse, E., *Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations*, Free Press, New York, 1976.

Murakami Kaoru, 'Nikkan kaidan no kiken na sokumen', in *Asahi jānaru*, October 10, 1965, pp.54-57.

Muramatsu Michio and Krauss, Ellis S., 'Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan', in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.78, No.1, March 1984, p.128.

Nahm, Andrew C., *Korea: Tradition and Transformation - A History of the Korean People*, Hollym Corporation, Seoul, 1988.

Nakagawa Nobuo (b), 'Kankoku keizai no genjitsu to keizai kyōryoku', *Gendai no me*, October 1965, pp.48-57.

Nakagawa Nobuo, 'Jōyaku no keizaiteki sokumen', *Asahi jānaru*, October 19, 1965, pp.51-54.

Nakagawa Nobuo, *Chōsen Mondai eno kihonteki shikaku*, Tabata shoten, Tokyo, 1976.

Nakano Ryōsuke, "'Nikkan kokkō seijōka wa nikkan kokumin no daitasū ga sansei shiteiru" noka', *Chōsen kenkyū*, August 1965, pp.31-33.

Nikkan kankei o kiroku suru kai hen, *Shiryō nikkan kankei I - seiji keizai gōmon no jittai*, Gendaishi shuppankai, Tokyo, 1976, pp.19-46.

Nikkan kankei o kiroku suru kai hen, *Shiryō nikkan kankei I I-jinmyaku kinmyaku KCIA no jittai*, Gendaishi shuppankai, Tokyo, 1976, pp.250-256.

Noguchi Yūjirō, 'Nikkan keizai "kyōryoku" no kyokō', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkan mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.122-147.

Oda Shigeru, 'Nikkan gyogyō kyōtei no seiritsu', in *Juristo*, no.327, August 1965, pp.17-23.

Ogawa Seiryō, 'Zainichi kankokujin no hōteki chi-i taigū kyōtei', *Hōritsu jihō*, vol.37, September 1965, pp.24-34.

Ōhira Zengo, 'Nikkan no shinkankei o tenbōsu', *Toki no kadai*, February 1966, pp.6-10.



Okimoto, Daniel I., 'Ex-Bureaucrats in the Liberal-Democratic Party', in eds. Okimoto, Daniel I. and Rohlen, Thomas P., *Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society and Political Economy*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.187-190.

Okita Saburō, *The Developing Economies and Japan: Lessons in Growth*, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1980.

Okonogi Masao, 'Chōsen hantō o meguru kokusai seiji', in *Chōsen hantō no seiji keizai kōzō*, ed. Mitani Shizuo, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, Tokyo, 1983, pp.132-169.

Ōno Shinzō et al., 'Zadankai nikkan kokkō seijōka wa naze hitsuyōka', *Sekai jānaru*, May 1964, pp.14-19.

Pae Sung-Moun, 'The Two Koreans and the Northeast Asian International Subsystem', *Korea and World Affairs*, vol.5, no.2, Summer 1981, pp.203-217.

Park Ki-Chul, *Kankoku seijishi*, Shakai hyōron sha, Tokyo, 1977, pp.234-252.

Pempel, T.J., *Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1982, p.307.

Pempel, T.J., 'The Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.18, 1974, p.648. Also Fukumoto Tadao, *Kanryo*, Kobundo, Tokyo, p.142-3.

Pye, Lucian W., and Pye, Mary W., *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, Harvard University Press, 1985, p.180.

Reischauer, Edwin O., *The Japanese*, Tuttle and Company, Tokyo, 1977.

Rekishigaku kenkyūkai i-inkai, 'Seimei "nikkan jōyaku" kyōkōsaiketsu ni kōgisuru', *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, January 1966, p.62.

Rikui Saburō, 'Amerika no kyokutō senryaku ni okeru chōsen hantō no ichi', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkan mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.185-208.

Saitō Tadashi, 'Betonamu no kyōkun to nikkan seijōka', *Jiyūsekai*, October 1965, pp.32-37.

Saitō Takashi, 'Ajia no minzoku undō to nikkān jōyaku', in *Shirīzu nihon to chōsen 1 - nikkān mondai o kangaeru*, eds. Saitō Takashi and Fujishima Udai, Taihei shuppansha, Tokyo, 1965, pp.263-285.

Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Japanese-South Korean Cooperation: Its Implications in the Context of the Sino-American Confrontation', *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, vol.IV, no.2, August 1966, pp.52-59.

Sasaki Ryūji, 'Imakoso nikkān jōyaku no minaoshi o', *Sekai*, April 1993, pp.120-136.

Sekai henshūbu, 'Ankeito nikkān kaidan ni kansuru watashi no iken', *Sekai*, April 1964, pp.192-215.

Sekai jānaru henshūbu (b), 'Nikkān kōshō kaiko to tenbō', *Sekai jānaru*, May 1964, pp.10-13.

Sekai jānaru henshūbu, 'Matamoya nagareta nikkān kōshō', *Sekai jānaru*, May 1964, pp.6-7.

Shin Kak-Soo, 'Japan's Regional Role in Asia -A Korean Perspective-', *Korea and World Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp.276-297.

Sogawa Takeo, 'Nikkān shokyōtei no hōteki fōmyureishon', *Hōritsu jihō*, vol.37, September 1965, pp.4-11.

Solomon, Richard H., 'Coalition Building of Condominium? The Soviet Presence in Asia and American Policy Alternatives', in *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, ed. Zagoria, Donald S., Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, p.286.

Spaulding, Robert M., Jr., *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971.

Sugiyama Shigeo (b), 'Zaisan seikyūken mondai shori oyobi keizai kyōryoku kyōtei no shomondai', *Hōritsu jihō*, vol.37, September 1965, pp.18-23.

Sugiyama Shigeo, 'Nikkān kihon jōyaku oyobi zaisan seikyūken shori kyōtei tō no shomondai', *Juristo*, no.327, August 1965, pp.10-16.

Suzuki Mitsugu, 'Kankoku no uchimaku - sono sugao to fuankan', *Sekai jānaru*, May 1964, pp.20-23.

Suzuki Sao, "'Hōteki chi-i" meguru dōyō', *Asahi jānaru*, October 10, 1965, pp.86-91.

Takabayashi Hideo, 'Gyogyōkyōtei no mondaiten', *Hōritsu jihō*, vol.37, September 1965, pp.12-17.

Takasaki Sōji, 'Gendai no nitchō kankei', in *Nitchō kankei o kangaeru*, ed. Rekishigaku kenkyūkai, Aoki shoten, Tokyo, 1989, pp.157-178.

Takasaki Sōji, 'Nikkan jōyaku de hoshō wa kaiketsu shitaka', in *Sekai*, vol.572, September 1992, pp.40-47.

Tanaka Hiroshi, 'Nihon no sengo sekinin to asia - sengo hoshō to rekishi ninshiki', in *Iwanami kōza kindai nihon to shokuminchi 8 ajia no reisen to shokuminchika*, eds. Ōe Shinobu et al., Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1993, pp.183-216.

Tanaka Naokichi, 'Nikkan seijōka no sekkyoku teki igi', *Asahi jānaru*, October 10, 1965, pp.58-62.

Teramoto Mitsurō, 'Nikkan keizai kyōryoku wa dō shinten suruka', *Asahi jānaru*, May 16, 1965, pp.12-18.

Toki no ayumi henshūbu (b), 'Hantai seiryoku wa nani o neratte irunoka', *Toki no kadai*, December 1965, pp.24-30.

Toki no ayumi henshūbu, 'Hantai anken shūgi-in o tsūka', *Toki no ayumi*, November 27, 1965, pp.9-11.

Toki no kadai henshūbu, 'Kankoku mondai to kaku hōmen no iken', *Toki no kadai*, November 1965, pp.46-55.

Tōyama Ōyuki, "'Anpo kyōtō soshiki" no saigen - nikkai kaidan hantai undō no dōkō -' in *Toki no kadai*, February 1963, pp.13-16.

Uchida Kenzō et al., 'Nikkan hijyun o meguru seiji jōkyō', *Gendai no me*, October 1965, pp.68-86.

Wada Haruki, *Kankoku minshū o mitsumeru koto*, Sōjyū sha, Tokyo, 1981, pp.24-31.

Watanabe Yasuo, 'Kōmuin no kyaria', (The Career Patterns of Civil Servants), in ed. Tsuji Kiyooki, *Gyōseigaku kōza, dai 2-kan: Gyōsei no rekishi a*(Lectures on Public Administration, vol.2: The History of Public Administration), Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1976, pp.111-60.

Yakushiji Taizō, *Seijika vs kanryō: sapurai saido seijigaku no teishō*, Toyo keizai shinposha, Tokyo, 1987, pp.28-36.



Yamamoto Taichi, "'Ikkatsu kaiketsu ron" to "Jōho gaikō ron" no imi surumono', *Chōsen kenkyū*, vol.42, August 1965, p.21.

Yamamoto Tsuyoshi, 'Kan-nichi kankei to Yatsugi Kazuo', *Kokusai seiji*, vol.75, October 1983, pp.43-56.

Yasue Ryōsuke, 'Nanboku chōsen no genjō to tōitsu mondai', in *Nihon to chōsen o kangaeru*, Nigatsu sha, Tokyo, 1978, pp.53-59.

## APPENDICES

1. List of Japanese Foreign Ministry Officials - Survey Respondents  
(Confidential)
2. The General Questionnaire Sent to All Respondents  
- Japanese original and English translation
3. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Selected Respondents  
(Confidential) - Japanese original and English translation

## APPENDIX 1

### List of Japanese Foreign Ministry Officials - Survey Respondents (Names in Alphabetical order)

Funayama Shōkichi

Vice Minister of Ministry of Finance (1st round talks)

Iseki Yūjirō

Immigration Bureau Chief of Ministry of Justice (4th round talks) and Asian Bureau Chief of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(4th round talks - after spring 1959, 5th and 6th round talks)

Maeda Toshikazu

Northeast Asian Bureau Chief of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(6th round talks), He was also involved in the negotiation from the preparatory round talks as a research officer of Ministry's Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was working for Iseki Yūjirō.

Nakagawa Tōru

Treaties Bureau Chief of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (5th and 6th round talks). He was involved in the negotiation throughout the entire rounds of talks. He dealt with all the issues.

Nishimura Kenjirō

Vice Minister of Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.(4th round talks)

Uyama Atsushi

Secretary in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (5th round talks) and a research officer in the Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(6th round talks). He was in charge of fishery issue. He was also working for Iseki Yūjirō.



## APPENDIX 2

### The General Questionnaire Sent to All Respondents (Japanese original)

#### インタビュー内容

1. 日韓会談において、貴方は何回めの会談に参加されたのですか。また、その際の公式な役職名は何だったのでしょうか。
2. 会談における貴方の役割は、どのようなものでしたか。
3. そのような役割をもって日韓会談に関わられた貴方からみて、交渉において日本側が最も解決を望んでいた事項、あるいは最も強く主張した点とは何だったと思われますか。
4. 日韓会談において特に政治家、他省庁、団体、学者、などが交渉の立場、方針を左右したことがありましたか。それはどのような事項について、何を要求するものだったのでしょうか。
5. 上の質問について、他省庁、団体、個人等に交渉の立場、方針を左右されることがなかったとお答えになった場合、どうしてそう思われるのですか。
6. 日韓会談において日本政府の交渉姿勢、立場はアメリカのアジア政策に最も影響されたというのが一般の学説となっています。貴方はこれに賛同されますか。どうしてそう思われるのですか。

**The General Questionnaire Sent to All Respondents**  
(English translation)

1. In the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation negotiations, in which rounds of talks did you participate?
2. What was your role in the normalisation negotiations?
3. From your viewpoint, what were the issues which Japan wanted to resolve the most, or which were pursued most strongly?
4. Was there any occasion when you felt that the Japanese negotiating position was influenced by politicians, ministries, interest groups, academics, etcetera? If so, which issue was it? What did these interests demand?
5. If you answered no to the above, and felt that the Japanese negotiating position was never influenced by any of those groups or individuals, is there any particular reason why you feel that way?
6. The general academic interpretation of Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation is that the Japanese government's negotiating position was mostly influenced by America's East Asian policies. Do you agree? If so, why?

## APPENDIX 3

### A. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Uyama Atsushi (Japanese original)

#### 詳しい質問内容

1、日韓会談において、宇山様は第五代会談（昭和35年10月25日から翌年の5月16日）に、外務省参事官として、第六代会談（昭和36年10月20日から昭和39年4月6日）には外務大臣官房審議官、賠償部長として参加されたと思いますが、この他にも何らかの形で会談に参加されましたか？

2、会談における宇山様の任務は、主として請求権問題の交渉であったと思いますが、他の事項について参加されましたか？

3、請求権問題の交渉でご活躍された宇山様からみて、その過程で日本側が最も強く主張した点とはどのようなものだったのでしょうか？

＊ 第五代会談においては、日本側は請求権問題と平和線問題を一括処理することを望んでいたと思いますが、どうでしょうか？

＊ また、第五代会談の請求権分科委員会で日本は消極的だったといわれていますが、これは張勉政権の基盤が不安定であったからでしょうか？それとも、韓国側の主張が受け入れ難いものだったからでしょうか？（その場合、問題は、韓国側の提示した金額だったのですか、それとも、請求を賠償とする立場を譲らなかったからでしょうか？）

＊ 第六代会談においては、37年の初めごろまでは、請求権問題に関して双方の基本的考えにくいちがいがあることが明らかになり、会談が一時停止の状態に入るとされていますが、これは、第五代会談の時と同じ問題について対立したのでしょうか？それとも政権が変わったことによって、対立問題も変わったのでしょうか？

＊ 37年の秋に大平外相と金中央情報部長会談が請求権問題の政治的妥結をはかった後、請求権問題の討議は何を問題に進められたのでしょうか。（日本側は、漁業問題との一括妥結方針と、請求を賠償としない方針を維持したのでしょうか？韓国側はこれにどう反応したのでしょうか？）

＊ 37年の秋以前にも政治的妥結の努力はあったのでしょうか？それとも上記の会談が始めてだったのでしょうか？



4、会談の過程で、特定の個人、団体などから交渉の立場、方針を左右されたことがありましたか？

＊ 李政権が崩壊した後に、日本の経済関係者が韓国に興味を持つようになった、と言われていますが、会談にあたって、国交正常化による経済的利益を念頭に置かれたか？

＊ これらの経済関係者の訪韓活動や、調査活動、発言などに影響を受けたことがありましたか？

＊ 漁業関係者の抑留という事実、漁業組合の言動によって、交渉妥結を急がねばならない、という様な影響を受けたことがありましたか？

5、アメリカは、日韓の関係正常化を会談当初から支持、支援してきたと思いますが、特に第六次会談の後半、第七次会談の過程でアメリカのアジア政策を意識されましたか？

6、日韓会談において日本政府の交渉姿勢、立場はアメリカのアジア政策に最も影響されたというのが一般の学説となっています。宇山様はこれに賛同されますか？ どうしてそう思われるのですか？

**A. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Uyama Atsushi**  
(English translation)

1. Did you participate in the normalisation negotiations other than at the:
  - 5th round talks - October 25, 1960 to May 16, 1961 (as Secretary in Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
  - 6th round talks - October 20, 1961 to April 6, 1994 (as a research officer in the Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the chief for reparation issues)
2. I suppose that your main task were the negotiations for resolution of the reparations issue. Did you participate in negotiations other than this? If so, what were they?
3. From your experience in participating in the negotiations on the reparations issue, what were the issues which Japan most stressed during the negotiations?
  - Was the Japanese side hoping to settle the reparations issue and the issue of the 'Peace Line' at the same time during the Fifth Round talks?
  - The Japanese side did not seem to be enthusiastic about resolving issues at the Reparation Committee during the Fifth Round talks. Is that because the Chan Myŏn regime's instability? Or because of the amount of reparations the Republic of Korea required was unacceptable to Japan? (In that case, was the problem simply the amount of reparations, or the Korean position on receiving reparation for Japan's colonialism?)
  - During the Sixth round talks, the negotiation was almost terminated when it became clear that the negotiating position, especially on the issue of reparations, of Japan and Korea were very different. Was this due to the same problem as in the Fifth Round talks, on which the positions of both sides conflicted? Or had the focus shifted because of the regime change in Korea?
  - What were the issues for inclusion in the reparations negotiations after the political agreement by Foreign Minister Ōhira and the KCIA division head Kim in the Autumn of 1963?(Did the Japanese maintain the position of solving the fishery problem at the same time as normalisation, and to not give reparations to Korea as a compensation for colonisation? If so, how did the Korean side react to this Japanese position?)

- Was there any effort to reach a political agreement before the Autumn of 1963? Or was this the first attempt at such an agreement?
4. Do you think that the Japanese negotiating position was influenced by particular individuals or organisations?
    - The Japanese business community began to have an interest in Korea after the demise of the Rhee regime. Did you take into consideration the economic benefit for Japan which would be brought by the normalisation?
    - Were you influenced by any economic community groups visiting Korea, conducting investigation, or issuing statements?
    - Were you influenced by, or felt it necessary to settle issues early, because of the detention of fishermen, or by the statements of fishery organisations?
  5. The United States supported the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation process from the beginning. Were you conscious of the American East Asian policy, especially during the later half of the Sixth Round talks and Seventh Round talks?
  6. The general academic interpretation of the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation is that the Japanese government's negotiating position was mostly influenced by America's East Asian policies. Do you agree? If so, why?



B. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Nishimura Kenjiro  
(Japanese original)

詳しい質問内容

1、日韓会談において、西村様は第四次会談（昭和33年4月15日から35年の4月19日）に、水産庁次長として参加されたと思いますが、この他にも何らかの形で会談に参加されましたか？

2、会談における西村様の任務は、主として漁業問題の交渉であったと思いますが、他の事項について参加されましたか？

3、漁業問題の交渉でご活躍された西村様からみて、その過程で日本側が最も強く主張した点とはどのようなものだったのでしょうか？

＊ 第四次会談を再開したのは、漁業問題の解決を日本側が強く望んでいたからだと思いますが、どうでしょうか？

＊ 第四次会談の再開にあたって、日本は対韓国財産請求権を放棄していますが、これは、漁業問題の解決が財産請求よりも重要であったからだと思いますが、どうでしょうか？

＊ 第四次会談が始まって半年程して韓国側が積極性を示すようになった、といわれていますが、どうしてだったのでしょうか？（日本側が請求権問題について韓国の要求を受け入れる態度だったからでしょうか？）

＊ 休会中の34年2月から日本側は、北朝鮮人帰還に積極性を示していますが、日韓交渉への影響はありましたか？

＊ 李政権中には交渉がまとまらないとお考えになりましたか？（反日的な政策および請求する額の大きさなどからみて）

4、会談の過程で、特定の個人、団体などから交渉の立場、方針を左右されたことがありましたか？

＊ 漁業関係者の抑留という事実、漁業組合の言動によって、交渉妥結を急がねばならない、という様な影響を受けたことがありましたか？

＊ 北朝鮮人帰還は、政治的決断だったのでしょうか。それとも日韓交渉に

おける日本側の交渉手段の一つだったのでしょうか。

＊ 第四次会談においては、政治的妥結は試みられなかったのでしょうか。

＊ その他、会談中に民団、朝総連、学識経験者、市民団体、政治団体などの活動や発言に影響を受けましたか？

5、アメリカは、日韓の関係正常化を会談当初から支持、支援してきたと思いますが、特に第四次会談の過程でアメリカのアジア政策を意識されましたか？

6、日韓会談において日本政府の交渉姿勢、立場はアメリカのアジア政策に最も影響されたというのが一般の学説となっています。西村様はこれに賛同されますか？ どうしてそう思われるのですか？

**B. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Nishimura Kenjirō**  
(English translation)

1. Did you participate in the normalisation negotiations other than at the:

- 4th round talks - April 15, 1958 to April 19, 1960 - (as Vice Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries)

2. I suppose that your main task were the negotiations on the fishery issue. Did you participate in negotiations other than this?

3. From your experience in participating in the negotiations on the fishery issue, what were the issues which Japan most stressed during the negotiations?

- Did Japan reopen the negotiation by initiating the Fourth Round talks because it was considered necessary to solve the fishery problem?

- Japan abandoned the right to claim Japanese property left in Korea in opening the Fourth Round talks. Was this because solving the fishery problem was considered more important than the property claim?

- It is said that the Korean side seemed cooperative about six months after the Fourth Round talks began. Why was this? (Do you think that it is because Japan showed flexibility on the reparations issue or showed signs of accepting the Korean demands?)

- Japan showed interest in sending Koreans resident in Japan to the DPRK during the recession in the negotiations after February 1959. Was the normalisation process influenced by this?

- Did you think that the normalisation process was difficult during the Rhee regime? (Because of anti-Japanese policies and the huge amount of reparations claimed?)

4. Do you think that the Japanese negotiating position was influenced by a particular individual or organisations?

- Were you influenced, or felt it necessary to settle issues early, because of the detention of fishermen, or by the statements of fishery organisations?

- Was the sending of Koreans resident in Japan to the DPRK political decision? Or was it part of the Japanese negotiation strategy?



- Were there any political agreements between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning the normalisation?
  - Were you influenced during the negotiations by the activities or statements of *Mindan*, *Chōsōren*, academics, citizen's groups, or political parties?
5. The United States supported the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation process from the beginning. Were you conscious of the American East Asian policy, especially during the Fourth Round talks?
  6. The general academic interpretation of the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation is that the Japanese government's negotiating position was mostly influenced by America's East Asian policies. Do you agree? If so, why?

### 詳しい質問内容

1、日韓会談において、中川様は第五代会談（昭和35年10月25日から翌年の5月16日）と第六代会談（昭和36年10月20日から昭和39年4月6日）に、それぞれ外務省条約局長として参加されたと思いますが、その他にも何らかの形で会談に参加されましたか？

2、会談における中川様の任務は、どのようなものだったのでしょうか？  
（漁業問題、基本関係問題、請求権問題すべての交渉に携わられたのでしょうか？）

3、第五代会談、第六次過程で日本側が最も強く主張した点とは、それぞれどのようなものだったのでしょうか？

＊ 第五代会談、第六代会談それぞれにおいて、日本側は漁業問題の解決を最も望んでいたのでしょうか？それとも、漁業問題と請求権問題は同様に懸案だったのでしょうか？

＊ 第五代会談においては、日本側は請求権問題と平和線問題を一括処理することを望んでいたと思いますが、どうでしょうか？

＊ また、第五代会談の請求権分科委員会で日本は消極的だったといわれていますが、これは張勉政権の基盤が不安定であったからでしょうか？それとも、韓国側の主張が受け入れ難いものだったからでしょうか？（その場合、問題は、韓国側の提示した金額だったのですか、それとも、請求を賠償とする立場を譲らなかったからでしょうか？）

＊ 第六代会談においては、37年の初めごろまでは、請求権問題に関して双方の基本的考えにくいちがいがあることが明らかになり、会談が一時停止の状態に入たとされていますが、これは、第五代会談の時と同じ問題について対立したのでしょうか？それとも政権が変わったことによって、対立問題も変わったのでしょうか？

＊ 37年の秋に大平外相と金中央情報部長会談が請求権問題の政治的妥結をはかった後、請求権問題の討議は何を問題に進められたのでしょうか。  
（日本側は、漁業問題との一括妥結方針と、請求を賠償としない方針を維持

したのでしょうか？韓国側はこれにどう反応したのでしょうか？)

＊ 37年の秋以前にも政治的妥結の努力はあったのでしょうか？それとも上記の会談が始めてだったのでしょうか？

4、会談の過程で、特定の個人、団体などから交渉の立場、方針を左右されたことがありましたか？

＊ 基本的関係の交渉、請求権問題などについての民団、朝総連といった在日韓国、朝鮮人団体、学識経験者の考え方、言動などに影響を受けましたか？

＊ 李政権が崩壊した後に、日本の経済関係者が韓国に興味を持つようになった、と言われていますが、会談にあたって、国交正常化による経済的利益を念頭に置かれたか？

＊ これらの経済関係者の訪韓活動や、調査活動、発言などに影響を受けたことがありましたか？

＊ 漁業関係者の抑留という事実、漁業組合の言動によって、交渉妥結を急がねばならない、という様な影響を受けたことがありましたか？

5、アメリカは、日韓の関係正常化を会談当初から支持、支援してきたと思いますが、特に第六次会談の後半、第七次会談の過程でアメリカのアジア政策を意識されましたか？

6、日韓会談において日本政府の交渉姿勢、立場はアメリカのアジア政策に最も影響されたというのが一般の学説となっています。中川様はこれに賛同されますか？どうしてそう思われるのですか？



C. Personalised Questionnaires Sent to Nakagawa Tōru  
(English translation)

1. Did you participate in the normalisation negotiations other than at the:
  - 5th round talks - October 25, 1960 to May 16, 1961 (as the Treaty Bureau Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
  - 6th round talks - October 20, 1961 to April 6, 1994 (also as the Treaty Bureau Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
2. What were your tasks in the negotiations? (Were you involved in all the issues; fishery, basic relations and reparations?)
3. From your experience in participating in the negotiations, what were the issues which Japan most stressed?
  - Was the Japanese side hoping to resolve the fishery issue most of all, during the Fifth and Sixth round talks? Or were the fishery issue and the reparations issue of equal importance?
  - Was the Japanese side hoping to settle the reparations issue and the 'Peace Line' issue at the same time during the Fifth Round talks?
  - The Japanese side did not seem to be enthusiastic about resolving issues at the Reparations Committee during the Fifth Round talks. Is that because of the Chan Myōn regime's instability? Or because the amount of reparations the Republic of Korea required was unacceptable to Japan? (In that case, was the problem simply the amount of reparations, or the Korean position on receiving reparation for Japan's colonialism?)
  - During the Sixth round talks, the negotiations were almost terminated when it became clear that the negotiating position, especially on the issues of reparations, of Japan and Korea were very different. Was this due to the same problem as in the Fifth Round talks, on which the positions of both sides conflicted? Or had the focus shifted because of the regime change in Korea?
  - What were the issues for inclusion in the reparations negotiations after the political agreement by Foreign Minister Ōhira and the KCIA division head Kim in the Autumn of 1963?(Did the Japanese maintain the position to solve the fishery problem at the same time as the normalisation, and to not give reparations to Korea as compensation for the colonisation? If so, how did Korean side react to this Japanese position?)

- Was there any effort to reach a political agreement before the Autumn of 1963? Or was that the first time that such an agreement was reached?
4. Do you think that the Japanese negotiating position was influenced by particular individuals or organisations?
- Were you influenced by a particular individual, or groups, when you were negotiating on the issues of basic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, or on reparations?
  - The Japanese business community began to have an interest in Korea after the demise of the Rhee regime. Did you take into consideration the economic benefits for Japan which would be brought by the normalisation?
  - Were you influenced by any economic community groups conducting investigations, or issuing statements?
  - Were you influenced by, or felt it necessary to settle issues early, because of the detention of fishermen, or by the statements of fishery organisations?
5. The United States supported the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation process from the beginning. Were you conscious of the American East Asian policy, especially during the later half of the Sixth Round talks and Seventh Round talks?
6. The general academic interpretation of the Japan-Republic of Korea normalisation is that the Japanese government's negotiating position was mostly influenced by America's East Asian policies. Do you agree? If so, why?